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Abstract
Changes in healthcare regulation can have unintended consequences on the provision of health-
care services and health outcomes of individuals. This dissertation quantifies the indirect effects
of changes in healthcare regulation in three different settings. In the first chapter, I examine the
effects of an increase in Medicare fees on nursing homes’ willingness to treat Medicaid beneficia-
ries. Both Medicare and Medicaid offer health insurance, but they cover different services and pay
healthcare providers at varying levels of fees. The divergence between the payment structures of
the programs can create conflicting incentives for nursing homes, as Medicaid fees are less gen-
erous than Medicare fees. In the case of nursing homes, Medicare pays for skilled nursing care
and up to 100 days of residency, while Medicaid pays for custodial care and until the resident
dies or her condition improves. Thus, admitting a Medicaid resident has dynamic implications
for future capacity constraints on nursing homes, as assigning a bed to a Medicaid resident will
prevent the facility from using the bed for future highly profitable, Medicare residents. I find that
capacity–constrained nursing homes respond to an overly generous Medicare fee by substituting
away from Medicaid patients, who are low–profit patients. I exploit variation in the number of
certificate–of–need and moratorium laws across states to approximate for the severity of capacity
constraints. The chapter provides empirical evidence pertaining to indirect effects of Medicare
policy on the healthcare utilization of non-Medicare beneficiaries and enriches the ongoing de-
bate over the conflicting incentives between the Medicare and Medicaid programs and how this
disconnection affects beneficiaries.
In the second chapter I study the impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs)
on suicides. PDMPs aim to discourage prescription drug abuse and diversion by requiring phar-
macies to report the names of both patients and prescribers to a central database when dispensing
controlled-substance drugs such as OxyContin. The recent empirical evidence supports the critical
role PDMPs play in reducing opioid prescriptions, especially those with the highest potential for
abuse. In this study, we hypothesize that a negative supply shock to the market for diverted drugs,
like the implementation of a PDMP, has differential effects on the total number of suicides. We
first develop a dynamic model of addicts’ choice between continued drug use, exerting effort to
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quit drugs, or committing suicide. In the absence of drug treatment services, a negative shock to
the supply of prescription drugs makes a drug habit unsustainable, and thus the addict commits
suicide. On the other hand, in places with strong addiction–help networks, the productivity of a
unit of effort towards recovery is higher. In this case a negative supply shock boosts the incentive
to seek treatment. We test the predictions of our model using information regarding the number of
suicides and treatment facilities at the county level and find that PDMPs reduce suicides in coun-
ties with strong addiction-help networks. A major policy implication of this study is that access to
drug treatment centers is an important factor in the fight against the opioid epidemic.
Finally, in the third chapter I explore the responses of pediatricians to the implementation of
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997. The findings reinforce prior evidence
that pediatricians decrease their work hours in response to increases in the number of Medicaid-
enrolled children. This is consistent with CHIP crowding out private insurance for children. I
provide evidence that the response is due in part to changes in the extensive margin, as physicians
in high–expansion states are more likely to move from solo practices to large practices such as
group practices and hospitals. The latter results suggest that expansions in public health insurance
can change the labor supply of physicians as well as the market structure of healthcare markets.
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Chapter 1
Medicare Reimbursement Policy and Capacity
Constraints: Evidence from Nursing Homes
Medicare is the largest insurer in the U.S. healthcare industry, accounting for 20.1% of total
healthcare expenditures. Healthcare providers typically offer services to both Medicare and non–
Medicare patients, so a change in the reimbursement policy of a large payer such as Medicare could
affect the number of services offered to both Medicare and non–Medicare patients (Sloan, Mitchell
and Cromwell 1978, McGuire and Pauly 1991 and Glazer and McGuire 2002). Empirical stud-
ies have found a positive effect of increases in Medicare fees on the number of services provided
to Medicare beneficiaries (Gillis and Lee 1997, Clemens and Gottlieb 2014, Eliason et al. 2018,
Einav, Finkelstein and Mahoney 2018); there is less evidence, however, regarding the spillover
effects of Medicare reimbursement policy on the supply of services to non-Medicare beneficiaries.
In this paper, I assess how an increase in Medicare fees affects providers’ willingness to treat
Medicaid beneficiaries in nursing homes. Both Medicare and Medicaid offer health insurance,
but Medicare covers acute care for individuals above 65 years of age (hereafter “seniors”), while
Medicaid covers acute care and long–term care for eligible low–income individuals. More im-
portantly for the purpose of this study, payment incentives for healthcare providers may diverge
between the programs because the federal government establishes payment rules for Medicare,
while each state establishes payment rules for Medicaid. The nursing home market is an inter-
esting setting in which to study interaction between the two government programs, for several
reasons. First, Medicaid beneficiaries in need of nursing home care are among the most vulnerable
subpopulations of non–Medicare beneficiaries, as they include seniors and disabled persons who
have limited income and resources. Second, the majority of Medicaid residents (95% by 2011) re-
ceive care in nursing homes that also care for Medicare residents (skilled nursing facilities); thus,
a change in reimbursement by one payer, i.e., Medicare, may have first-order consequences for
the other payer’s beneficiaries, i.e., Medicaid residents. Third, the senior population has grown
by 40% since the early 2000s, but the number of nursing home residents has remained constant
(Figure 1.1). Surprisingly, this pattern differs between Medicare and Medicaid residents, with the
average number of Medicare beneficiaries served in nursing homes increasing by 25.4% and the
average number of Medicaid beneficiaries served decreasing by 4.76% (Figure 1.2).
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The cause of the shift from Medicaid towards Medicare in nursing homes is unclear, but I hy-
pothesize that interaction between capacity constraints and a larger gap between Medicare and
Medicaid profit margins is responsible for an important share of the observed substitution pat-
tern. Specifically, capacity–constrained facilities, i.e., facilities with high occupancy rates, incur
high opportunity costs for admitting a low–profit residents today (Medicaid patients), as this will
prevent them from using a given bed in the future for a high–profit resident (Medicare patients).
In contrast, facilities working below capacity, i.e., experiencing low occupancy rates, have empty
beds and hence incur no opportunity costs for admitting low–profit residents today. Therefore,
capacity–constrained facilities may disproportionately substitute away from low–profit residents
when payment incentives differ across payers.
In the case of nursing homes, Medicare and Medicaid cover distinct services. In particular,
Medicare covers short–term skilled nursing care and pays up to 100 days of residency,1 while
Medicaid covers long–term custodial care for people needing help with daily self–care activities,2
and it pays until the resident dies or her condition improves. Thus, admitting a Medicaid resident
has dynamic implications for future capacity constraints on nursing homes, as assigning a bed
to a Medicaid resident will prevent the facility from using the bed for future Medicare residents.
Although Medicare residents are by definition more costly to care for than Medicaid residents, in
this market, as in other healthcare markets, Medicare residents generate higher profit margins than
Medicaid residents (Troyer 2002, MedPAC 2005, Floyd 2004, Feinstein and Fischbeck 2005 (as
cited in Grabowski 2007)). Thus, an increase in the payment gap may induce capacity–constrained
facilities to substitute Medicaid for Medicare residents.
Any attempt to measure the impact of the payment gap and capacity constraints on the popu-
lation of Medicaid residents in nursing homes faces two challenges: the payment gap is endoge-
nously determined by the case mix (the severity of patients’ conditions) chosen by each facility,
and both supply and demand jointly determine the occupancy rate. To address the first challenge,
I use quasi-experimental policy variations following a large increase in Medicare fees mandated
in the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999, and
the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000.
These laws increased by 6.7% and 20%, respectively, the daily fees that Medicare pays to nursing
homes for severely ill Medicare patients, especially those with rehabilitation needs and clinically
complex cases. The increase in fees was effective from fiscal years 2001 to 2005, and was moti-
1For example, physical therapy, speech therapy and also more complex care such as intravenous therapy and
specialized feeding. Such care is delivered by therapists, registered nurses, and licensed vocational nurses.
2Custodial care involves helping with activities of daily life such as toileting, eating, medication aid, and bathing.
Such care is provided mainly by aides.
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vated by concerns regarding beneficiaries’ access to nursing home services (OIG 1999, OIG 2000,
and OIG 2001). The new payments were considered overly generous by the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which estimated an aggregate Medicare profit margin of 15.3%
in 2004 (MedPAC 2005).
The second challenge that complicates measuring the impact of the payment gap and capacity
constraints is that occupancy rates are endogenous and thus estimating the causal effects of ca-
pacity constraints is less straightforward. To overcome this limitation, I exploit variation in the
number of certificate–of–need (CON) laws and moratorium laws that restrict the growth and entry
of new participants in the long–term–care sector across states. These laws regulate the supply of
nursing home services and also of substitutes for nursing home services such as home–based care,
residential care, and adult day care. I show that nursing homes in heavily CON–restricted states
have higher occupancy rates than facilities in states with comparatively lax regulation, and thus
capacity constraints are on average more binding in the regulated states. Using the total number of
rules in place in 1998, I divide states into two regimes: constrained and unconstrained. I then use
a difference–in–differences (DD) identification strategy to estimate the induced substitution effect
of an increase in Medicare fees. The underlying identification assumption is that nursing homes in
constrained and unconstrained states would have responded similarly to the rise in Medicare profit
margins absent the capacity constraints.
Using information at the state–year level, I find that in the presence of capacity constraints a
more generous Medicare fee crowds out Medicaid residents from nursing homes. In particular,
I find that the increase in Medicare fees in the early 2000s induced a decrease in the relative
number of residents whose stay is covered by Medicaid (hereafter ”Medicaid persons served”)
in constrained states by 6.1%. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant and negative
across multiple model specifications. Similarly, estimates for the effects on Medicaid expenditures
suggest a decrease of 5.3% in expenses. In terms of the number of residents whose stay is cov-
ered by Medicare (hereafter ”Medicare persons served”) and Medicare expenditures, the results
indicate that nursing homes in constrained states do not react differently from those in uncon-
strained states to the increase in Medicare fees. Hence, the findings suggest that the reaction to
the federal increase in Medicare fees is similar across regimes for the Medicare segment, but the
interplay between capacity constraints and Medicare reimbursement induced varying responses in
the Medicaid segment.
I then analyze data at the facility–year level, an approach that offers several advantages over
analyzing the state–year level data. First, using data at the facility–year level enables me to dis-
tinguish between responses at the extensive and intensive margins. Both margins have specific
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policy implications such as changes in admissions, i.e., at the extensive margin, reflecting changes
regarding who is admitted to nursing homes; while changes in the length of stay, i.e., at the in-
tensive margin, reflect changes in the intensity of care conditional on admission. Second, I can
confirm that time–invariant characteristics of facilities do not drive my results. Third, the data
include information about residents who pay out–of–pocket, which is an ideal group with which to
perform falsification tests because they also receive long–term care but pay higher daily fees than
the administrative fees paid by Medicare and Medicaid. Fourth, these data enable me to control for
contemporaneous changes in state policy.
Adding facility fixed effects and county–level time–varying controls produces coefficient esti-
mates that are in line with those obtained in the aggregate analysis. In particular, I find that the
increase in Medicare fees decreases the number of Medicaid admissions in constrained states rela-
tive to unconstrained states by 15.5%. Regarding responses at the intensive margin, the coefficient
estimate for the average length of stay suggests a decrease of 12.5%, although the coefficient is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Nonetheless, the combined effect on admissions and
the average length of stay is a statistically significant decrease of 25.5% in total Medicaid days in
nursing homes in constrained states relative to those in unconstrained states.
While the previous findings provide evidence of a crowding–out effect of Medicare on Medicaid,
it is important to verify that contemporaneous changes in state policy do not confound the analysis
of the reforms of interest. To do this, I redefine the capacity–constraint indicator in terms of the
occupancy rate observed for each facility in the pre–period and include state–year fixed effects. In
particular, I define capacity–constrained facilities as those with occupancy rates higher than 90%.
The coefficient estimates from this exercise are less precise, but the signs and magnitudes are in
line with those of the previous findings. Importantly, I show that my findings are driven by restric-
tions on supply as the effect comes mainly from capacity–constrained facilities located in states
previously identified as constrained. For example, I find that, within constrained states, facilities
with high occupancy rates relative to those with low occupancy rates reduce their Medicaid admis-
sions by 7.9% and their Medicaid days by 21.4%. In contrast, I find that, for unconstrained states,
Medicaid admissions decrease by 3.4% and Medicaid days by 1.3%.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. This paper provides, to the best of my
knowledge, the first causal evidence of the role of Medicare in the decline in nursing home uti-
lization by Medicaid residents. Building on extensive empirical evidence indicating how Medicare
and Medicaid policies influence the provision of services to their own beneficiaries, I pursue a
novel approach to shed light on how Medicare and Medicaid interact to affect healthcare use of
beneficiaries in the other program. Although providers can respond along margins such as qual-
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ity (Glazer and McGuire 2002 and Konetzka, Norton and Stearns 2006), pricing to other payers,
and coding procedures, the supply of services is the most important factor regarding social cost
(McGuire and Pauly 1991). Due to the concurrent surge in substitutes for nursing home care,
such as assisted living and in–home care, previous studies provide only suggestive or anecdotal
evidence pertaining to the shift in focus from long-term care covered by Medicaid to short-term
care covered by Medicare (Bishop (1999) and Wiener, Anderson and Brown (2009)). I use a large
variation in financial incentives induced by the increase in Medicare fees and variation in states’
CON/Moratorium regulations to show that capacity constraints and payment divergence between
Medicare and Medicaid disproportionately affect healthcare use by Medicaid beneficiaries. The
findings reported in this study provide empirical evidence of the effects of conflicting incentives
between Medicare and Medicaid in the long–term–care market, an issue that Grabowski (2007)
discusses in detail.
This paper also contributes to the broader literature on the behavior of healthcare providers
working with multiple payers. Empirical studies of spillover effects at the provider level are scarce
partly due to the need to carry out separate data–collection processes for each payer. Databases
with standardized information at the provider level about the services rendered to each payer and
for all U.S. states are either not publicly available or the data are hard to collect because there is no
centralized source. Thus, studies of hospitals and physicians tend to focus on the direct effects of
changes in Medicare reimbursement on services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries (Gillis and Lee
1997, Clemens and Gottlieb 2014, Eliason et al. 2018, Einav, Finkelstein and Mahoney 2018) or
use national surveys where access is measured through categorical variables (see Brunt and Jensen
2014). In the case of nursing homes, the Minimum Data Set contains detailed information by payer
but these data are not publicly available, and thus many empirical studies use a subsample of U.S
states. For example, in a recent working paper Hackmann and Pohl (2018) analyze how patient and
provider incentives drive utilization of nursing homes in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania. Although this latter paper is similar to my study insofar as both estimate how providers’
financial incentives affect Medicaid utilization in nursing homes, my analysis differs from theirs
since they consider only patients in long–term care (Medicaid vs paying out–of–pocket), while
I consider the substitution of long–term–care Medicaid residents with short–term–care Medicare
residents induced by Medicare reimbursement policy. Also, I have information for all U.S. states,
which allows me to exploit variation in CON regulations, and thus conclude that the effects of
capacity constraints on Medicaid access are driven mainly by supply.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides institutional details such as the benefits
covered, the method of payment, and trends in nursing home markets that distinguish between
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Medicaid and Medicare. Previous studies related to supply and spillover effects are reviewed in
section 1.2. In section 1.3, I present my econometric framework. In section 1.4, I describe my data
and variables. In section 1.5, I present results that suggest that the interaction between capacity
constraints and an increase in the payment gap between Medicare and Medicaid affects the access
of Medicaid beneficiaries to nursing homes. I discuss my results and conclude in section 1.7.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Medicaid for Aged and Disabled Persons
Eligibility
Medicaid eligibility criteria for aged and disabled persons have been relatively stable through time
when compared with those for other groups. For instance, the Children’s Health Insurance Program
and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially expanded Medicaid eligibility for children and
adults in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, while the largest change in Medicaid eligibility for aged
and disabled individuals dates back to 1972 with the establishment of the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program. Since 1972, states have been required to provide Medicaid coverage to all
SSI recipients or to aged and disabled persons who are eligible using the state’s Medicaid eligibility
standards that were put in effect in 1972. States that cover all SSI recipients automatically are
known as Section 1634 states; states that use the same SSI criteria as Social Security but make
their own Medicaid eligibility decisions are known as SSI Criteria states, and states that use the
eligibility standards of 1972 are known as Section 209(b) states. States that opted for Section
209(b) may use more restrictive criteria than SSI does when determining Medicaid eligibility. As
of 2017, only Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota
and Virginia are Section 209(b) states.
There are additional pathways that enable aged and disabled persons with incomes above the
SSI benefit rate to obtain Medicaid coverage. The first pathway is the Special Income Rule that
extends Medicaid coverage to aged and disabled individuals with at least 30 consecutive days
of institutional care and incomes up to 300 percent of the SSI rate. The second pathway is the
Medically Needy Programs that extend Medicaid coverage to aged and disabled persons of any
income level if, after deducting their medical expenses from their incomes (“spend down”), they
become eligible for Medicaid. Third, in some states aged and disabled persons with incomes up
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to 100 percent of the Federal Poverty Line are eligible for Medicaid. As can be seen in Table
A1, the availability of these pathways varies widely between states and thus access to nursing
home care depends heavily on the state of residence. Finally, all states are required to provide full
or partial Medicaid benefits to the poorest Medicare beneficiaries. These individuals are termed
“dual eligible.”
Benefits
Medicaid covers Long Term Services and Supports (LTSS), which include nursing home care and
home and community-based care. For these services the number of covered days is not limited,
and beneficiaries are entitled to receive them until their conditions improve or they die. Care in
a nursing home requires that the beneficiary reside in the facility, where she will be assisted with
her activities of daily living (ADLs) and medical-treatment-related care. On the other hand, home
and community-based care enables beneficiaries to stay in their homes, and Medicaid will provide
in-home care such as home health services, personal care services (PCS), and adult daycare. Nurs-
ing home care and home health services are federally mandated benefits. All Medicaid-eligible
individuals in every state are entitled to these services when they are medically necessary. The
large majority of home and community-based services (HCBSs) are, however, optional benefits
for states. Thus, their availability varies state by state.
Although HCBSs are optional benefits, the Federal government has provided multiple stimuli
to encourage states to shift from nursing home care toward HCBS care in an effort to rebalance
the overall Medicaid long-term care system in favor of HCBSs. Figure A.1 shows that Medicaid
expenditures on HCBSs increased markedly after 2000, driven mainly by the expansion of personal
care services in California and Florida. HCBSs are generally preferred over institutional care
by the aged and disabled population and are also substantially cheaper than nursing home care.
According to the Genworth 2017 Cost of Care Survey, the median annual cost of a semi-private
room in a nursing home is $85,775, while the median annual cost of a home health aide is $49,192.
Nevertheless, evidence pertaining to the cost-effectiveness of expanding HCBSs is mixed (Kane
et al. 2013, Wysocki et al. 2014 and Newcomer et al. 2016), and it is difficult to target HCBSs only
to individuals who would otherwise enter nursing homes (Grabowski, 2006).
Initiatives designed to expand HCBSs followed the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Olm-
stead v. Zimring that required states to provide community-based services to persons for whom
institutional care is inappropriate. Following that ruling, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services created Real Choice System Change (RCSC) Grants that provided funds to develop the
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HCBS infrastructure in awardees’ states. The work done through RCSC grants laid the basis for
the enactment in 2005 of the Money Follows the Person (MFP) Demonstration Program, the largest
demonstration program designed to transition individuals living in long-term care institutions back
into the community. By the end of 2015 there were 44 states with active MFP grants and a cumula-
tive 63,337 individuals who transitioned into communities from institutions (Mathematica Policy
Research, 2016). The most recent expansions of HCBSs occurred with the implementation of the
ACA in 2010. The ACA increased funding for MFP and created the Balancing Incentive Program
(BIP) and Community First Choice Option (CFC). The BIP provided financial incentives to enable
states to increase access to HCBSs, and the CFC (also known as 1915 (k) waivers) allowed states
to provide attendant services with an emphasis on self-directed services.
Lastly, it should be noted that, even though states have made significant progress in shifting
toward HCBSs, access to these services is often restricted because states have only predetermined
numbers of slots, generating long waiting lists for the waivers. O’Malley and Musumeci (2018)
find that in 2016 there were 656,195 individuals on waiting lists who had waited on average 23
months to be assigned a slot. Moreover, in some states the financial eligibility criteria have been
stricter for HCBSs than for nursing home care. For example, in 1998, the only year in my study
period for which I have data on the Medicaid financial eligibility requirement, 19 states denied
income/asset protection to spouses of HCBS recipients while they offered protection for spouses
of nursing home residents.
Medicaid Reimbursement Policy for Nursing Homes
States have autonomy in designing the payment system for their Medicaid programs but most have
converged on a Prospective Payment System (PPS) for nursing homes (MACPAC 2016). Under
PPS, facilities are paid daily fees that are set in advance and without adjustment to reflect actual
costs. The base fee is determined by a facility’s costs in previous years (facility-specific rates) or
by the costs for all facilities in a class/group (flat rates). Because under the flat-rate scheme there
is no relationship between an individual facility’s costs and the base fee, such a scheme is con-
sidered less generous than the facility–specific rate (Grabowski, 2001). Additionally, most states
adjust base fees to account for patient characteristics (case mix), and some states make supple-
mental payments. Supplemental payments are often made to public facilities and correspond to
lump-sum payments that equal the difference between Medicaid payments and an Upper Payment
Limit (UPL). The UPL corresponds to what Medicare would have paid for the same services and
it applies to hospitals, nursing homes, and intermediate care facilities for individuals with intel-
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lectual disabilities. As of 2011, UPL supplemental payments accounted for 2.4% of total Medi-
caid payments to nursing homes, while it accounted for 25.3% of Medicaid payments to hospitals
(MACPAC 2012)
1.1.2 Medicare for the Elderly and Permanently Disabled
Eligibility
Medicare is available for people aged 65 years or older who are eligible for Social Security, for
persons with end–stage renal disease, and for disabled individuals who qualify for Social Secu-
rity Disability Insurance (SSDI). SSDI covers disabled persons who have worked and paid Social
Security taxes for a specified period of time.
Benefits under Part A
Medicare covers skilled nursing care for beneficiaries with doctor referrals and recent three-day
or longer inpatient hospital stays. If a beneficiary needs only part-time skilled nursing care then
she can apply for home health services, but if she requires more than part-time skilled nursing care
then the service is provided in a nursing home. Medicare covers room and board, medications, and
rehabilitation therapy at nursing homes. In general, Medicare covers acute healthcare needs and
thus pays for only up to 100 days of a nursing home stay. The beneficiary does not pay for the first
20 days of the stay, but after that pays a daily co–payment of $167.5 (as of 2017).
Medicare Reimbursement for nursing homes under Part A
Since 1998, Medicare has reimbursed nursing homes under a PPS, or a predetermined fee per day
of stay. The base fee is adjusted to account for patient characteristics and geographic location. The
following formula represents a simplified version of the Medicare per-day fee in year t:
Fee j,u,a(i),t = Labor Related j,u,txWage Adjustmenta(i),t +Non-Labor Related j,u,t (1.1)
where j is the group in which a patient is classified according to the level of care she needs; u is
an adjustment factor for facilities located in urban areas, and a(i) is an additional adjustment for
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nursing homes in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). During the study period there were 44
Resource Utilization Groups (RUG) into which patients were classified. Table 1.1 reflects the use
of a simplified version of the RUG categories and presents the nursing–time index, the therapy–
time index, and the average fee for three major classes of RUGs: Rehabilitation, Medium-Care
and Low-Care. As can be seen in Table 1.1, patients classified in Rehabilitation RUGs are the only
ones that use therapy resources, while Medium-Care patients have the highest average nursing
index (1.07). These differences in resource utilization translate into higher average fees for these
two groups of patients compared with Low-Care patients (Column 3 Table 1.1).
Medicare Price Shock
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP BBRA of 1999, and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
BIPA of 2000 increased the fees that Medicare pays to nursing homes. In November 1999,
Congress authorized a 16.66% increase in the nursing component of the fee and a 4% increase
in the fee for all RUGs for fiscal years (FYs) 2001 and 2002. Additionally, in response to concerns
over the adequacy of payments, Congress authorized a 20% fee increase for Medium-Care RUG
groups that went into effect for FYs 2001 through 2005. One year later, the BIPA raised the fee for
Rehabilitation RUG groups by 6.7% for FYs 2002 through 2005 (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 1.1).
Figure A.2 displays the evolution of three supply indicators of nursing home services to Medicare:
persons served, covered days of care, and charges to the Medicare program. All three indicators
exhibit accelerated growth after the implementation of BBRA and BIPA. It is worth noting that
covered days of care and charges to the program grow at the same rate from 2000 to 2008, with an
average real growth rate of 38% relative to 2000 levels.
1.2 Literature Review
Healthcare providers can respond to a fee change along many margins. Providers can adjust the
services they supply, their coding procedures, and the manner in which they produce services
(quality). Supply of services is however the most important category in terms of social cost. For
this reason much of the literature on the effect of Medicare reimbursement policy has focused on
finding the direction and magnitude of the supply effect. Most studies estimate supply responses
in the Medicare segment, while far less is known about the spillover effects on other insurers
(Medicaid and private insurers). In studies of direct effects, findings suggest that most providers
respond to increases in Medicare fees by providing more care to Medicare beneficiaries. For
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example, Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) find that physicians provide on average 3% more services
to Medicare beneficiaries when the program increases its fee by 2%. In more recent work, Eliason
et al. (2018) show that long–term acute–care hospitals (LTCHs) increase the length of stay by 23%
in response to an increase in daily Medicare’s daily fees.3 On the other, Dafny (2005) finds no
evidence of changes in hospitals’ intensity or quality of care after Medicare increased the fee for
some diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Dafny finds, however, a strong upcoding effect with a rise
of 0.022 in the fraction of patients classified in the DRGs with the largest fee increases.
Theory predicts the existence of spillover effects of Medicare reimbursement policy when the
same healthcare provider serves patients from separate insurers, but empirical studies on the spill-
over effects on healthcare use by non-Medicare patients remain scarce. In their seminal work
McGuire and Pauly (1991) propose a model of physician inducement behavior under multiple
payers. The model indicates that physicians respond to a change in payments by adjusting their
inducement behavior across segments. The magnitude of the cross effect is predicted to be stronger
the larger the payer and the higher the payer pay gap. Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell (1978) and
Brunt and Jensen (2014) show that even without inducement behavior, a payment change can affect
the provision of physicians’ services to other programs if capacity constraints are binding. This
result follows from the fact that profit-maximizing physicians will choose to treat the high–profit
patients over low–profit patients. Empirical studies on spillover effects of Medicare reimburse-
ment policy on supply of services to non-Medicare beneficiaries are scarce or inconclusive.4 For
instance, Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) test for effects on private patient care, but their estimates are
too noisy and thus uninformative about substitution effects. In contrast, Brunt and Jensen (2014)
find that a 10% increase in Medicare fee generosity produces a small effect on physician accep-
tance of new Medicare beneficiaries, but an increase by 3% of the probability that a physician will
accept new Medicaid patients.
Nursing homes have long been thought to face capacity constraints. The literature has identified
CON laws and construction moratorium legislation designed to limit the expansion of existing
facilities and the entry of new participants as the main sources of excess demand in this market
(Nyman 1988,1989, 1993; Zinn 1994; Harrington et al. 1997). Empirical studies have found that
Medicaid residents, the less-profitable type of nursing home resident, bear the burden of these
capacity constraints (Scanlon 1980, Gertler 1989, Grabowski et al. 2004, He and Konetzka 2015).
3Using the same setting, Einav, Finkelstein and Mahoney (2018) find that discharges from LTCHs increase sub-
stantially after Medicare fees increase, and they find no evidence of an impact on patient mortality.
4Many studies examine the effects of Medicare Advantage (MA) on Traditional Medicare (TM) (Chernew, DeCicca
and Town 2008, Baicker, Chernew and Robbins 2013, Baicker and Robbins 2015 and Callison 2016). These studies
vary in focus, but in general they find a negative spillover effect of MA reimbursement policy on healthcare use by
TM beneficiaries.
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In a recent working paper Hackmann and Pohl (2018) show that nursing homes discharge relatively
healthy Medicaid residents when capacity constraints are binding so they can allocate beds to
more profitable residents who can afford out–of–pocket payments (private–pay residents). The
authors use short-term variation in occupancy rates to proxy for capacity constraints similar to
Freedman (2016) for neonatal care units. Hackmann and colleague also estimate the effects of
patient incentives on utilization and find that private–pay residents relax their efforts to leave a
home once Medicaid starts paying for their stays. Although this latter paper is similar to my study
in that we both estimate how providers’ financial incentives affect Medicaid utilization in nursing
homes, my analysis differs from theirs insofar as they consider substitution among long–term care
patients (Medicaid vs Private), while I consider substitution in which long–term care Medicaid
residents are replaced by short–term care Medicare residents.
Since the late 1990s occupancy rates and other measures of excess demand in the nursing home
market have been declining (Strahan 1997, Bishop 1999, Grabowski 2001, Wiener, Anderson and
Brown 2009). Demographic and policy forces are responsible for these changes as substitutes for
nursing home care have been emerging (Bishop 1999). For instance, Grabowski, Stevenson and
Cornell (2012) find that a 10% increase in assisted living capacity decreases by 1.4% the utilization
of nursing homes by private–pay patients. On the other hand, the descriptive analysis of Wiener,
Anderson and Brown 2009 suggests that expanding assisted living facilities and Medicaid HCBSs
have little effect on the number of nursing home residents. In contrast, Wiener and colleagues find
that states witnessing the largest increases in the percentage of Medicare residents experienced
consistent declines in nursing home use. I use variation in occupancy rates and increments in
Medicare fees to disentangle the causal effects of Medicare policy on the decrease in Medicaid
residents in nursing homes.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy exploits variation in the number of laws that restrict the growth of long–
term care services across states, and variation in Medicare profit margins over time. I use the fact
that capacity constraints are on average more binding in states that heavily regulate the supply of
long–term care services to hypothesize that a change in payment incentives–such as the increase in
Medicare fees–disproportionately impacts the payer–mix choice of facilities in heavily regulated
states compared with what occurs in facilities in states with laxer regulation. This happens because
facilities with sufficiently high occupancy rates (capacity–constrained) face high opportunity costs
for admitting low-profit residents, as this prevents them from using those beds in the future for
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high-profit residents. In contrast, facilities working below capacity have large numbers of empty
beds and thus no opportunity costs for admitting low-profit residents. In the nursing home industry,
as in other healthcare sectors, Medicare residents are associated with higher profit margins than
Medicaid residents (Troyer 2002, MedPAC 2005, Floyd 2004, Feinstein and Fischbeck 2005 (as
cited in Grabowski 2007)). Thus an increase in Medicare fees is expected to induce capacity–
constrained facilities to substitute away from Medicaid residents.
I use information on the number of CON laws and moratorium states’ laws to divide states
into two regimes: constrained and unconstrained. I first compare the effects of the Medicare
fee increase on access of Medicaid beneficiaries to nursing homes separately for each regime. I
then construct DD estimates of the induced substitution effect of the increase in Medicare reim-
bursement. This model relies on the identifying assumption that the response of nursing homes
in constrained and unconstrained states would have evolved similarly in the absence of capacity
constraints.
With this background in mind, I divide the empirical analysis into two parts. First, I examine
evidence at the state–year level using data for the number of persons served in nursing homes
and the charges covered for rendered services in these facilities. Second, I run the analysis at the
facility–year level using information on the number of admissions, length of stay, and census of
residents by ‘type of payer’ (Medicare, Medicaid and Other) in nursing homes. My study period
runs from 1998 through 2004 whenever the data are available for the earliest year. Throughout the
analysis, I date the introduction of the fee increase in 2000 because the rule was first published for
comments during that year. Additionally, my study period ends in 2004 so I exclude the effects of
the implementation of the MFP program, the largest Medicaid demonstration program to transition
individuals living in nursing homes back into the communities.
1.3.1 State–Level Analysis
I first group states into constrained and unconstrained states according to the number of CON/
Moratorium laws that were in place in each state in 1998. In Column 10 of Table A.1 I report the
total number of laws that regulated the supply along the long–term care continuum, i.e., the growth
of nursing homes, home and health agencies, hospital bed conversion, residential care, and adult
day care. The state with the highest number of restrictions is Mississippi with 8 laws in place out
of the 9 possible laws, and the states with the lowest number of restrictions are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico and Pennsylvania, which have no CON/Moratorium laws.
The scope and stringency of CON/Moratorium laws may vary across states and because of this
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a high number of restrictions does not necessarily translate into a high occupancy rate. Thus, I
conduct a graphical and linear regression analysis to examine the relationships between the above
mentioned variables. Figure 1.3 shows that there is a positive relationship between the number
of restrictions and occupancy rates, and Table 1.2 indicates that the relationship is statistically
significant. Column 2 in Table 1.2 indicates that adding one CON/Moratorium law is associated
with 1 percentage point increase in the occupancy rate. Moreover, I construct a binary measure to
divide states into either the constrained or the unconstrained category to avoid relying on the linear
relationship between the number of restrictions and the occupancy rate. I identify constrained states
as those with 4 or more CON/Moratorium laws and unconstrained states as those with fewer than 4
laws. The threshold corresponds to the 75th percentile of the variable number of CON/Moratorium
laws. As can be seen in Column 2 of Table 1.2, the binary measure has greater explanatory power
than the count variable as measured by F-statistics.
I now move on to estimate the reaction to the increase in Medicare fees along the two regimes:
constrained and unconstrained states. The basic idea behind the identification strategy is that a
more generous Medicare fee will induce facilities to increase services rendered to Medicare ben-
eficiaries and this will negatively impact the access of Medicaid beneficiaries to the extent that
capacity constraints are binding. A first approximation is to perform a before/after comparison of
the outcomes while separating along the two regimes:
logYs,t,r = θs +δ×POST + εs,t,r, (1.2)
where Ys,t,r is an outcome variable for state s in year t in regime r; POST is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one for years after 2000, and θs is a state fixed effect. Throughout the
analysis I estimate the equations with weighted least squares where the weight is the square root
of the population that is over 75 years of age, which is the population that is more likely to need
long–term-care services. In this way I account for differences in the precision with which state
means are estimated. Also, I cluster standard errors at the state level.
To measure the direct effects of the fee change I use as outcome variables expenditures for nurs-
ing home services covered by Medicare and the number of Medicare persons served in nursing
homes. I use the same outcome variables for Medicaid to measure spillover effects. Previous
studies find a positive direct effect of Medicare reimbursement on care provided to Medicare ben-
eficiaries, and therefore I expect δ to have a positive sign for Medicare-related outcomes. The
research hypothesis regarding spillover effects is that the effects will vary between the regimes.
Other things being equal, a raise in Medicare fees will induce an increase in the opportunity cost
for admitting a Medicaid resident in constrained states, as admitting a Medicaid resident in any of
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those states will prevent the facility in question from using that bed in the future for a higher-profit
Medicare resident. In contrast, unconstrained states bear no opportunity costs for admitting a Med-
icaid resident today because there are a large number of empty beds available for future Medicare
residents in those states.
After examining the simplified before/after comparison, I estimate a DD model where the de-
pendent variables are Medicaid expenditures and the number of Medicaid beneficiaries served, and
the treatment is the increase in the opportunity cost for admitting a resident whose stay is paid by
Medicaid. This model is based on the identifying assumption that the expenditures and the num-
ber of Medicaid persons served would have evolved similarly in both regimes in the absence of
capacity constraints. I first estimate an event study to test for pre–existing trends. In particular:




βt×Constraineds +Zs,tϑ+ εs,t , (1.3)
where Ys,t is an outcome variable for state s in year t; θs and γt are state and year fixed effects; Zs,t
are time–varying state control variables. I omit t = 2000 so that each βt is estimated relative to
the year immediately preceding the change in Medicare’s fees. Estimates for βt for years before
2000 capture the importance of pre–existing trends that are correlated with the status of being a
constrained or an unconstrained state. The estimates for βt for years following 2000 measure the
effects of the induced increase in opportunity cost on the outcome variables Ys,t .
Following the event–study analysis, I estimate the DD version of equation Equation 1.3, i.e., I
hold the δt coefficients constant within the before and after periods. The estimation equation then
becomes:
log Ys,t = θs + γt +β×POST ×Constraineds +Zs,tϑ+ εs,t . (1.4)
1.3.2 Facility–Level Analysis
The aim of this section is to reinforce my findings by showing that they are not driven by time–
invariant facility characteristics or by concurrent reforms in state policy. First, I replicate the
results from the state-level analysis but I add controls for state time–varying variables, county
time–varying variables, and facility fixed effects. My main specification is:
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log Yi,t = αi +β×POST ×Constraineds(i)+Zs(i),tϑ1 +Xc(i),tϑ2 + εi,t , (1.5)
where αi are facility fixed effects; Constraineds(i) indicates that a facility is located in a constrained
state, and Zs(i),t and Xc(i),t are state and county covariates. Throughout the analysis I estimate the
equation with weighted least squares where the weight is the square root of the total number of
beds in the pre–period, and I clustered standard errors at the state level. The coefficient of interest
is δ, which captures the differential effects of the increase in Medicare fees on constrained and
unconstrained facilities. I also estimate the event–study version of Equation 1.5 to test for pre–
existing trends.
The dependent variables that I use here vary with respect to the state-level analysis because in
this case I sort the total number of admissions and the average length of stay by ‘type of payer.’
Assessing the effects on these variables is another advantage of the facility-level data as I can esti-
mate the impact on the extensive (admissions) and intensive (length of stay) margins. These mar-
gins have very different implications for policy purposes. The extensive margin reflects changes in
decisions about whom to treat, while the intensive margin pertains to the intensity of care provided
to residents.
Second, I redefine my constrained treatment indicator and allow it to vary by nursing home. To
do so, I compute the occupancy rate by facility using the closest resident census before fiscal year
2000. The resident census is collected during health inspections of all the nursing homes in the
U.S., which are conducted every 12–15 months. I redefined capacity–constrained facilities as those
with an occupancy rate equal or greater to 90%. Figure 1.4 provides evidence that at 90% there is a
sharp decline in the share of residents that are Medicaid beneficiaries at the time of the inspection.
This break suggests a decrease in preferences for low-profit residents. To avoid a mechanical
relationship between the share and the occupancy rate I use the occupancy rate from the Medicare
Cost Reports to construct Figure 1.4. It is important to note that the 90% threshold is in line with the
findings in Hackmann and Pohl (2018), which show that facilities increase their efforts to discharge
Medicaid residents after they reached a 89% occupancy rate. I also introduce variation over time in
payment incentives while keeping the constrained classification constant, and thus any unobserved
invariant characteristic across facilities would cancel out. More importantly, the redefinition of the
treatment variable allows me to include state–year fixed effects in Equation 1.5 and in this way
control for contemporaneous changes in state policy variables such as the expansion of Medicaid
HCBSs.
Third, I run all previous equations for residents paying with ‘Other’ sources as they are an
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ideal group on which to perform falsification tests. The category ‘Other’ residents includes out–
of–pocket payments for which nursing homes are free to charge higher fees than their publicly
insured counterparts. Therefore, I should not see any effect on this group as they are the highest–
profit residents.
1.4 Data and Sample
I obtain information on Medicare reimbursement policy for nursing homes from the Federal Regis-
ter for fiscal years 1999 to 2004. With this information I construct Table 1.1, which summarizes the
increase in Medicare fees by RUG. To measure variation in the number of CON/Moratorium laws,
I use information collected by Harrington and Carrillo (1998) to construct the capacity–constrained
proxy by state. I define capacity–constrained states as those with 4 or more CON/Moratorium laws
in place in 1998. Table A.1 displays the rules that apply in each long–term care sector: nursing
homes, home and health agencies, hospital bed conversion, residential care, and adult daycare. In
the main analysis I exclude New York because the state differs significantly from other states in
important regulation dimensions. On the one hand, the majority of facilities in New York partic-
ipated in the Nursing Home Case-Mix and Quality (NHCMQ) Demonstration, a demonstration
that transitioned facilities from the Medicare cost–based payment system to the new Medicare
prospective-payment system (PPS). Facilities in New York had been paid under the new PPS sys-
tem since 1995, while the rest of the country adopted that system later, in 1998. Thus, it is expected
that the increase in Medicare fees affects facilities in New York differently from the way it affects
facilities in other states. On the other hand, New York is the only state in the U.S. that did not
allow facilities to certify only a fraction of their beds for Medicare (a practice known as distinct
parts) while requiring them to certify all beds if they were to offer services to Medicare. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this practice was used to ration Medicare access, although OIG (2000a) do
not find strong evidence for this claim. Because of this difference in regulation I exclude New York
from my main analysis.
I draw the main outcome of interest for the state–level analysis, persons served in nursing homes
and expenditures, from Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplemental records. To obtain results
for outcome variables for the facility–level analysis I use information on the number of admissions,
average length of stay, and days of care by ‘type of payer’ from Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs). I
exclude from my sample facilities that were hospital-based or government-owned as they are reim-
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bursed differently from free-standing facilities (see section 1.1).5 To compute the occupancy rate
by facility I use the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database. Information
available in the OSCAR database is collected through the standard certification survey that is an
unannounced on-site health inspection (mentioned above) performed on all certified nursing facil-
ities in the U.S. every 12–15 months. OSCAR reports the resident census by ‘type of payer’ at the
time of the survey, the total number of health deficiencies, the number of nurses, beds, and other
facility characteristics such as for-profit status and ownership.
Lastly, I obtain state and county–level covariates from the County Business Pattern (CBP), the
Survey of Epidemiology and End Results (SEER), the Area Health Resource File (AHRF), the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). From CBP
I compute the number of assisted-living facilities by county, adding the number of establishments
in NAICS 623311 (continuing care retirement communities) and 623312 (assisted living facilities
for the elderly). From the SEER I construct demographic variables such as total population, and
population by age brackets, gender, and race. From the AHRF I obtain the total number of long–
term care providers and personal income per capita by county, and from the BEA and the BLS I
obtain state economic variables such as personal income per capita and unemployment rates.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Trends and Descriptive Statistics
To illustrate changes in the payer mix of facilities during my study period, I plot the evolution
of the average number of individuals served in nursing homes by type of payer and constrained
status in Figure 1.5. Figure 1.5a shows that in constrained and unconstrained states the average
number of Medicare persons served increases between 1999 and 2004. In constrained states the
mean increases from 23,662 to 28,876 and in unconstrained states it increases from 28,797 to
33,976. Figure 1.5b shows that unconstrained states behave differently to constrained states in
the Medicaid segment. In particular, in unconstrained states the average number of Medicaid
persons served increases from 31,470 to 32,837, while in constrained states the average number of
Medicaid persons served decreases from 28,667 to 27,538.
In Table 1.3 I report summary statistics for the outcome variables used in the state–level analysis
and the facility–level analysis. Results reported in Panel A indicate that there are on average 29,578
5Free-standing facilities are entities that are neither integrated with nor departments of any hospital.
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Medicare beneficiaries served in nursing homes in a given state–year, while there are on average
31,132 Medicaid beneficiaries served. This difference translates more than proportionally into a
difference in total expenditures, with the average Medicare expenditure at $429,937,320 and the
average Medicaid expenditure at $662,664,620. The total expenditures reflect differences in prices,
total numbers of individuals served, and average length of stay. At the state level I do not have
information indicating lengths of stay or total numbers of days of care for Medicaid residents, so I
use facility-level information to shed light on these separate margins. The results reported in Panel
B indicate that on average a Medicare resident stays 45.9 days while a Medicaid resident stays
378.3 days. The difference in the average length of stay highlights the dynamic implications of
assigning a bed to a Medicaid resident on future capacity constraints. Specifically, if a capacity–
constrained facility admits a Medicaid resident the bed will be occupied for at least a year, while if
it reserves the bed for Medicare residents the bed could be used to treat multiple Medicare residents
over the course of a year. The difference in length of stay also translates into a higher number of
Medicare admissions (102.07) compared with Medicaid admissions (40.76).
1.5.2 Main Findings
I first report and interpret the results for the state–level analysis. Table 1.4 illustrates the be-
fore/after estimator for the effects of an increase in Medicare fees on Medicare expenditures,
Medicare persons served, and Medicaid persons served, distinguishing by regime. Throughout this
section the dependent variables always refer to values observed for nursing home services. The
results reported in columns 1 and 2 indicate that an increase in Medicare fees is associated with
an increase in Medicare expenditures and the number of Medicare persons served. The coefficient
estimates are positive and statistically significant for both regimes, and are in line with previous
studies of other markets that find a positive supply effect. In contrast, the results reported in col-
umn 3 indicate that the number of Medicaid persons served in constrained states decreases by 2.6%
while it increases by 3.5% in unconstrained states. Both coefficients are statistically significant at
the 10% level. I further test the equality of coefficients between constrained and unconstrained
states for each dependent variable, and find that the coefficient estimates are statistically different
only for the number of Medicaid beneficiaries served in nursing homes (Row 3). These results pro-
vide suggestive evidence that the reaction to the federal increase in Medicare fees is similar across
regimes for the Medicare segment, but the interplay between capacity constraints and Medicare
reimbursement induced varying responses in the Medicaid segment.
I now show graphically how the number of Medicaid persons served and Medicaid expenditures
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evolved over time between 1999 and 2004 in constrained and unconstrained states. Figure 1.6a
plots estimates of the event–study model in Equation 1.3 for the number of Medicaid persons
served. The coefficients are normalized to the base year 2000, the year before the fee increase.
First, note that in the pre–period there is no statistically significant difference between the figures
for constrained and unconstrained states which supports the identifying assumption of no pre–
existing trends. However, the coefficient estimates for the years after 2000 show that after Medicare
increased its fees the number of Medicaid persons served declines in constrained states relative the
number served in unconstrained states and the effect becomes stronger during the later years of the
study period. Figure 1.6b shows the coefficient estimates for Medicaid expenditures, and as can be
seen they follow a similar trend to the trend in the number of beneficiaries served. The figures point
to an overall decrease in nursing home services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries in constrained
states relative to those served in unconstrained states as a result of the Medicare policy change.
In Table 1.5 I report the coefficient estimates for the DD specification in Equation 1.4. For ref-
erence, in column 1 I report the mean for each of the dependent variables. In column 2 I report
the estimates for the weighted linear model without controls beyond state and year fixed effects.
To obtain the results reported in column 3 I add controls for time–varying state variables such as
a state’s population, personal income, the unemployment rate, and the percentage that is female,
among other variables. In column 4 I present the estimates without weights and without controls.
I report my preferred specification in column 2 because the weights account for differences in
the precision with which state means are estimated, and some of the control variables might also
change as a result of the policy change. Therefore, the magnitudes analyzed from here on corre-
spond to those reported in column 2. The DD exercise for the state–level analysis suggests that
the increase in Medicare fees led to a 6.1% decrease in the relative number of Medicaid persons
served in constrained states. This coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5% through
all specifications. The coefficient estimate for Medicaid expenditures indicates a decrease of 5.3%
that is statistically significant at 16%. The remaining panels show the effects on Medicare sup-
ply. Like the results reported in Table 1.4, the DD exercise shows that there are no statistically
significant differences between the responses to the increase in Medicare fees in constrained and
unconstrained states.
I now evaluate the response using facility–level information. The available data include neither
the number of individuals served nor expenditures by payer, but it does provide the number of
admissions, average length of stay, and days of care by payer. As was true for the results reported
in Table 1.4, here I first estimate the before/after specification for each regime with controls for
state covariates. The results reported in Table 1.6 indicate that after the increase in Medicare fees
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the Medicate segment in constrained states exhibits no statistically significant change but there is a
slowdown in the Medicaid segment. For Medicaid residents the coefficient estimates suggest that
the number of admissions decreases by 7%, the average length of stay by 10.8%, and the total days
of care by 19.8%. In contrast, in unconstrained states there is no statistically significant change in
either the Medicare or the Medicaid segment. When testing for the equality of coefficient estimates
across regimes (the results are reported in Row 3), one can observe that the more likely differences
in the responses are in Medicaid admissions and Medicaid days.
I impose additional structure on the estimation by evaluating an event–study specification where
I add controls for time–varying county-level variables. In Figure 1.7a I plot the coefficients for
the event–study model of admissions on interaction between year dummies and the constrained
state indicator. Similar to the pattern observed for the state–level analysis, the pattern revealed in
Figure 1.7a suggests that there are no pre–existing trends, and more importantly the facility–level
data corroborates the finding that, after the Medicare fee increase, there is clear evidence of a rela-
tive decline in Medicaid admissions in facilities located in constrained states. Figure 1.8a displays
results of a similar exercise for the number of Medicaid days. As can be seen, the coefficient
estimates are noisier although the point estimates continue to suggest a decline.
In Table 1.7 I report the coefficient estimates for the DD specification. The results reported in
column 2 indicate that the increase in Medicare fees induced a 15.5% decrease in Medicaid admis-
sions in constrained states relative to admissions in unconstrained states. More importantly, the
coefficients on average length of stay and total days of care suggest that providers also responded
in the intensive margin. The effect on the average length of stay suggests a decrease of 12.5%
although the coefficient is not statistically significant at 10%. The combined effect on admissions
and average length of stay resulted in a statistically significant decrease of 25.5% in the total num-
bers of Medicaid days in constrained states relative to the corresponding numbers in unconstrained
states
1.6 Robustness
In this section, I check that my results are robust to changes in the specification, namely, to redef-
inition of the constrained indicator and also present falsification tests. For the falsification tests I
use information about Medicaid utilization in settings other than nursing homes such as physician
and dental service facilities. For the facility–level analysis I use data on residents paying from
other sources, a group that includes people making out–of–pocket payments for long–term–care
services. The results are all consistent with those presented in section 1.5.
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1.6.1 Alternative Measure for Capacity Constraints
A concern regarding my main results is that time–varying state covariates and county covariates
might not adequately capture contemporaneous changes in state policy. I therefore redefine my
treatment variable (capacity–constrained) as a function of the observed facility occupancy rate in
the pre–period. Specifically, I define high-occupancy-rate facilities as those with occupancy rates
equal to or greater than 90%. Once I have variation at the facility level, I can include state-by-
year fixed effects in the regressions and in this way control for possible contemporaneous changes
in state policy. In Table 1.8 I report the results for the DD coefficient estimator using this new
treatment variable separated by regime. The coefficient estimates are less precise but the signs and
magnitudes are in line with those of previously reported findings. The results reported in column
1 indicate that, in constrained states, facilities with high occupancy rates relative to those with low
occupancy rates decrease their Medicaid admissions by 7.9% and their Medicaid days by 21.4%.
In contrast, in unconstrained states Medicaid admissions to high-occupancy-rate facilities declined
by 3.4% relative to admissions in low-occupancy-rate facilities while Medicaid days declined by
1.3% ). The difference between the estimated coefficients for facilities in constrained and uncon-
strained states is significant at 11% for the number of days, but it is insignificant for the number of
admissions.
1.6.2 Falsification Tests
Table 1.9 shows the results for the DD coefficient estimator of Equation 1.4 using as dependent
variables the number of Medicaid beneficiaries served and expenditures on other services, namely
physicians, hospitals, dental services, and X-rays. As can be seen, there is no statistically sig-
nificant change in these other services between constrained states and unconstrained states. This
provides evidence that my coefficient estimator for POST ×Constrained in the results section
captures changes in the nursing home market and not changes in the Medicaid program as a whole.
For the facility-level analysis I use the group of residents paying with other sources, which
includes the highest-profit residents, i.e., residents making out–of–pocket payments, to further
confirm that my research design captures the effect of payment divergence between Medicare
and Medicaid but not other contemporaneous changes. The idea behind the test is that capacity
constraints should affect access of low-profit residents only, as profit-maximizing facilities will
prioritize the admission of high-profit residents. Moreover, residents making out–of–pocket pay-
ments are an ideal comparison group because they require long–term care under Medicaid but do
not face access restrictions due to capacity constraints because profit–maximizing facilities will
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likely privilege their admission. Figure 1.7b and Figure 1.8b display the coefficient estimates for
the event–study regression framework. The results reported in column 3 indicate that there are no
statistically significant effects of an increase in Medicare fees on the number of admissions or days
of care for this category. These results support the research hypothesis that capacity constraints
disproportionately affect access of low-profit residents, in this case Medicaid residents.
1.6.3 Continuous Measures of Number of CON laws and Occupancy Rates
In the main specification I use a binary measure to divide states/facilities between constrained and
unconstrained. In this section, I construct bins of the total number of restrictions, and bins of
occupancy rates, to check if my results continue to hold when I use a continuous measure. Column
3 in Table A.3 shows that only states with four or more CON laws decrease the number of Medicaid
persons served relative to states with zero restrictions. Similarly, column 4 shows that the greater
are the number of restrictions the stronger is the decrease in Medicaid expenditure. In line with the
previous results, the estimates for the facility level analysis also show that the closer are facilities to
reach their full capacity the stronger is the decrease in Medicaid admissions (column 3 Table A.4).
1.6.4 Home and Community-Based Services
A threat to my identification strategy is that constrained states expand their HCBS programs the
same year as the change in Medicare reimbursement policy. To assess this concern I collected in-
formation on the number of participants in Medicaid HCBS programs from the following reports:
LeBlanc, Tonner and Harrington (2001), Kitchener, Ng and Harrington (2007), and O’Malley and
Musumeci (2018). I compute the DD effects of the Medicare fee increase on the number of Med-
icaid HCBS participants and the Medicaid Expenditure in HCBS. Table A.8 shows the results for
this exercise. The DD estimator is negative and statistically insignificant at the 10%. This suggests
my results are not driven by a relative increase in Medicaid HCBS programs in constrained states
relative to unconstrained states. Also, in Table A.9 I show the relationship between the number of
Medicaid persons served and lags and leads of number of HCBS participants. As can be seen, the
coefficients are not statistically significant but more important the negative coefficient on the lead
of HCBS suggests that the current number of Medicaid persons served in nursing homes impacts
negatively the number of HCBS and not the other way around.
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1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The utilization rate of nursing homes decreased over the first two decades of the twenty–first cen-
tury, although the elderly population was growing rapidly during that period. This pattern differs by
type of payer with the number of Medicare residents in nursing homes increasing and the number
of Medicaid residents decreasing. In this paper, I formulate an empirical test of the crowding–out
effect of Medicare on Medicaid based on a difference–in–differences identification strategy. I find
that the interplay between capacity constraints and more generous Medicare fees has produced a
decline in the number of Medicaid admissions and the average length of stay of Medicaid resi-
dents in facilities in constrained states compared with facilities in unconstrained states. In contrast,
the results for Medicare residents and residents making out–of–pocket payments show no relative
change, which raises concerns about the financial incentives created by a generous Medicare fee
and confirms the hypothesis that the divergence between Medicare and Medicaid payments in a
market with binding capacity constraints disproportionately affects access for Medicaid residents.
Despite theoretical predictions regarding the spillover effects of a change in payer payment
incentives on the healthcare use of other payers, previous empirical studies have found it difficult
to quantify this effect. This paper uses a novel multi–sourced dataset to study spillover effects on
the extensive and intensive margins. The margins have distinct policy implications. Changes in
admission patterns reflect changes in who is admitted to nursing homes, and changes in length of
stay reflect changes in intensity of care conditional on admission. I find that both of these margins
are decreasing as a consequence of an increase in Medicare fees and state policies that restrict the
supply of long–term–care services. Quantifying these spillover effects is essential for policy design
because the indirect effects of a change in Medicare policy may compensate for or weigh against
the direct/intended effects. This is particularly true for the nursing home industry in connection
with which studies have already identified conflicting incentives associated with Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
The analysis in this paper is concerned most directly with the impact of Medicare fee increases
on the utilization of nursing homes. A broader study could also examine the effects of the increase
in Medicare fees on the use of in–home care. If Medicaid beneficiaries who are not admitted into
nursing homes are receiving alternative care through home and community–based programs, this
would imply that Medicare reimbursement policy induced “cost shifting” from nursing home care
to in–home in constrained states. On the other hand, if Medicaid beneficiaries are not receiving
in–home care or if in–home care is not appropriate for their health conditions, then the decrease in
Medicaid admissions to nursing homes could translate into worse health outcomes and an increase
in hospitalizations of Medicaid beneficiaries. These questions set a natural direction for future
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research.
Lastly, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services will launch a new case mix model for
nursing homes in fiscal year 2020 that aims to correct the current bias towards rehabilitation care.
The new Patient–Driven Payment Model (PDMP) focuses on clinical factors rather than minutes
of therapy to devise a formula for determining Medicare payments. The change in the case–mix
model responds to concerns regarding the role of Medicare in motivating the provision of services
based on a facility’s financial motives rather than Medicare resident needs. This paper shows
that this misalignment of Medicare payment schemes also affected the provision of services to




Figure 1.1: Population Likely in Need of Long–Term Care and Nursing Home Residents
Note: Trends for the population aged 65 and older are computed from Survey of Epidemiology and End Results Population Data. The trend for the
number of nursing home residents is computed from Online Survey, Certification and Reporting data.
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Note: Trends are computed from Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement for the study period.
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Note: The figure plots occupancy rates and the total number of CON/Moratorium laws. I compute the number of CON/Moratorium laws using
information reported Harrington and Carrillo (1998).
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Note: The figure shows the relationship for facilities that serve Medicare and Medicaid residents in the pre–period. Facilities that serve only
Medicare residents or only Medicaid residents are excluded. The y–axis corresponds to partial residuals from a regression of the share of Medicaid
residents on county covariates. The occupancy rate corresponds to the ratio of the total number of days of care and bed days available from the
Medicare Cost Reports (MCR).
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Note: Trends are computed from Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement for the study period.
Figure 1.6: Event–Study Plot of the DD Effects of the Increase in Medicare Fees on Medicaid





















































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Note: The figure plots the interaction between year dummies and the constrained indicator from Equation 1.3.The estimates are weighted by state
populations of individuals over 75 years of age in the pre–period. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.7: Event–Study Plot of the DD Effects of the Increase in Medicare Fees on Medicaid
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Note: The figure plots the interaction between year dummies and the constrained indicator using facility–level information. The estimates are
weighted by number of beds in the pre–period and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Figure 1.8: Event–Study Plot of the DD Effects of the Increase in Medicare Fees on Medicaid
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Note: The figure plots the interaction between year dummies and the constrained indicator using facility–level information. The regressions include
time-varying state and county controls. The estimates are weighted by number of beds in the pre–period. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level.
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Table 1.1: Medicare Fee Schedule and Increments Implemented in BBRA and BIPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Requirement Average Fee Price Increase
Nursing Therapy FY 1999 BBRA BIPA
Rehabilitation 1.04 1.21 $269.56 4% 6.7%
14 RUGs
Medium–Care 1.07 0 $184.39 20%
12 RUGs
Low–Care 0.61 0 $134.06 4%
18 RUGs
Source: Author’s calculations using information obtained from Federal Register issues for FYs 1999 through 2005.








F statistic 5.52 10.99
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates from linear models. The dependent variable is the occupancy rate in a state× year. The independent
variables are the total number of CON/Moratorium laws (Column 2), and the binary indicator for states with 4 or more CON/Moratorium laws
(Column 3). The regressions include the contiguous United States and DC.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics, 1998–2005
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Max
Panel A: State Level Analysis
Medicare Persons Served (number) 29,578.58 27,332.01 758 20,836 120,507
Medicare Expenditure (thousand dollars) 429,937.32 461,093.81 14,988 277,277 2,587,323
Medicaid Persons Served (number) 31,132.23 29,613.21 893 23,067 126,159
Medicaid Expenditure (thousand dollars) 662,664.62 654,407.06 15,062 445,289 3,070,522
Panel B: Facility Level Analysis
Medicare Admissions (number) 102.07 87.11 0 78 520
Medicare Average Length of Stay (days) 45.91 25.94 0 40 219
Medicare Days of Care (number) 3,311.53 2,450.62 0 2,724 13,348
Medicaid Admissions (number) 40.76 49.29 0 24 280
Medicaid Average Length of Stay (days) 378.31 385.04 0 307 2,489
Medicaid Days of Care (number) 17,430.15 14,573.66 0 17,029 67,313
Note: The table reports unweighted summary statistics for outcome variables used in the state–level analysis and the facility–level analysis. Data
span the years 1999 through 2004 for the state–level analysis and 1998 through 2005 for the facility–level analysis. The data source for the
state–level outcome variables is Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplemental reports, and for the facility–level outcome variables Medicare
Cost Reports.
Table 1.4: Effect of Medicare Reimbursement Policy on Access to Nursing Home Services
(State–Level Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regime Expenditure Persons Served Observations
Medicare Medicare Medicaid {States}
Constrained 0.348∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ 105 {15}
(0.036) (0.027) (0.010)
Unconstrained 0.310∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 231 {33}
(0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
p–value of differencea [0.347] [ 0.380 ] [ 0.002 ]
Note: Each cell of the table presents the estimated coefficient for the POST variable in Equation 1.2 from separate regressions of the column
variable using the sample of states in each regime: constrained/unconstrained. The observations are made at the state–year level. All the regressions
are weighted by the pre–period population over 75 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
a I compute these statistics from a pooled linear model of the column variable on POST , the interaction term POST ×Constrained. The p–values
are for the coefficient estimates of the interaction term.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Individuals Served and
Expenditures in Nursing Homes by Type of Payer (State–Level Analysis)
Coefficient on POST ×Constrained Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare Persons Served 0.027 0.006 0.009 52441.726
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023)
Medicare Expenditure 0.038 0.029 0.010 723852.82
(0.041) (0.033) (0.031)
Medicaid Persons Served -0.066∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ 58264.187
(0.021) (0.016) (0.019)
Medicaid Expenditure -0.044 -0.045 -0.030 1127174.3
(0.040) (0.036) (0.030)
Observations 336 336 336
Weight Y Y Y
Controls N Y N
Note: In each cell of the table I report the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the dependent variables in each row on
the DD estimator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In the first column I report coefficient estimates from a weighted linear model without
controls. In the second column I report the coefficient from a specification that includes controls and uses weights. I use the income per–capita,
unemployment rate, assisted living facilities per 100,000 population, adult day care facilities per 100,000 population, participants in HCBS per
100,000 population, and the fraction of the population that is: black, white, female, 20-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. In the third
column I report the same coefficient but using no weights and no controls.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Effect of Medicare Reimbursement Policy on Access to Nursing Home Services
(Facility–Level Analysis)
Admissions Average length of stay Days of Care
Medicare Medicaid Medicare Medicaid Medicare Medicaid
Constrained 0.008 -0.070 -0.005 -0.108∗∗ 0.001 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.045) (0.018) (0.044) (0.044) (0.058)
Unconstrained 0.028 0.058 -0.019 0.012 0.008 0.039
(0.022) (0.072) (0.019) (0.086) (0.026) (0.156)
p–value of differencea [ 0.53] [0.13] [ 0.60] [0.22] [0.89] [0.16]
Note: Each cell of the table presents the estimated coefficient for the POST variable from separate regressions of the column variables using the
sample of facilities in each regime: constrained/unconstrained. The observations are made at the facility–year level. All regressions are weighted
by the pre–period number of beds. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All regressions include controls for time–varying state covariates,
namely per capita income, unemployment rate, percentage of the population below 19 years of age, percentage of the population between 20–29
years of age, percentage of population between 40–64 years of age, percentage that is female, percentage that is white, and percentage that is black.
a I compute the statistics from a pooled linear model of the column variable on POST , the interaction term POST ×Constrained, and the state
covariates interacted with the dummy for Constrained. The p–values are for the coefficient estimates of the interaction term.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Admissions and Days of Care in




POST ×Constrained -0.017 -0.154∗∗ 0.021
(0.038) (0.067) (0.036)
Mean 108.01 54.48 86.38
Panel B: Average Length of Stay
POST ×Constrained -0.050∗ -0.110 .
(0.027) (0.100) .
Mean 50.38 427.42 .
Panel C: Days of Care
POST ×Constrained -0.016 -0.243 0.034
(0.027) (0.161) (0.031)
Mean 3438.46 21957.63 19052.04
Facilities 11912
Observations 82116
Note: Each cell of the table reports the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the dependent variables on the DD
estimator, facility fixed effects, year fixed effects, state covariates, and county covariates (refer to Equation 1.5). The dependent variable for Panel
A is the logarithm of the number of admissions, for Panel B the logarithm of the average length of stay, which is not available for ‘Other’ residents,
and for Panel C the logarithm of days of care. I run a separate regression for each payer in the columns and dependent variables. All regressions
are weighted with the number of beds observed in the pre–period. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Medicaid Admissions, Average
Length of Stay, and Days of Care Using an Alternative Measure for Capacity–Constrained
Facilities (Facility–Level Analysis)
(1) (2) (3)
Constrained States Unconstrained States p–value of differencea
Panel A: Medicaid Admissions
POST ×High -0.096 -0.049 [0.52 ]
(0.064) (0.035)
Mean 51.92 55.43
Panel B: Medicaid Average Length of Stay
POST ×High -0.075 0.019 [0.22 ]
(0.053) (0.052)
Mean 419.55 430.36
Panel C: Medicaid Days of Care
POST ×High -0.197∗∗ -0.027 [ 0.13]
(0.079) (0.078) (0.077)
Mean 24023.31 21186.67
Observations 22291 59825 82116
Facilities 3154 8758 11912
Note: Each cell of the table presents the estimated coefficient for the POST ×High variable where High is the alternative definition of capacity
constraints using the observed occupancy rate in the pre–period. Facilities with occupancy rates greater or equal to 0.9 were classified as High.
The columns define the sample that I use for estimation. For example, the first cell in the table represents the coefficient for POST ×High using
facilities in states classified as constrained using the number of CON/Moratorium laws. All the regressions include facility and state–year fixed
effects, and are weighted by beds observed in the pre–period. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
a I compute these statistics from a pooled linear model of the panel variable on the interaction term POST ×High and the triple interaction
POST ×High×Constrained. The p–values correspond to the triple interaction terms.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Falsification Tests. Medicaid Persons Served Through Other Services (State–Level
Analysis)
Coefficient on POST ×Constrained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physicians Hospitals Dental X–Ray
Medicaid Persons Served 0.022 0.165 -0.056 0.001
(0.132) (0.127) (0.537) (0.140)
Mean 756676.75 187616.08 169918.27 471702.69
Medicaid Expenditure -0.008 0.081 0.183 0.030
(0.121) (0.194) (0.599) (0.265)
Mean $264980.97 $829281.21 $37433.18 $57933.52
Observation 288
States 48
Note:: Each cell of the table reports the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the dependent variables in each row on
the DD estimator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects for each of the services listed in the columns. All regressions are weighted with the
population over 75 years of age in the pre–period.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
A Path Out: Prescription Drug Abuse, Treatment and
Suicide
Over the past two decades, a prescription drug abuse epidemic has spread across the United
States, driven primarily by the increased use and abuse of opioid medications.1 Recent research
attributes a reversal of the decades-long trend in falling mortality rates among middle-aged white
non-Hispanics to the combined effects of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as a potentially related
cause, suicide (Case and Deaton, 2015a). In tandem with the rise in prescription drug abuse has
been an increase in reported pain, which is strongly associated with the age and geography of the
rise in suicide.2 However, despite these suggestive correlations, the causal links between the rise
in deaths due to prescription drug abuse and suicide largely remain unexplored.
Responses to the prescription drug abuse epidemic must weigh the merits of policies targeting
the supply or demand for prescription drugs. Traditional law enforcement approaches to combating
drug abuse focus on reducing the supply of illegal or diverted drugs. However, economists and
public health researchers have long been critical of an exclusive focus on supply-side measures,
instead suggesting that demand-side interventions, particularly drug treatment, can be as or more
effective in reducing mortality and other adverse outcomes.3 Given the unsettled debate on the
merits of supply versus demand-side policies, it is unsurprising that we know very little about
interactions and potential complementaries between the two approaches.
In this paper, we examine the response of suicide to disruptions in the supply of prescription
drugs, with a particular focus on the role of drug treatment in mediating the relationship between
The published version of this chapter can be access at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.006. As-
sistants professors Mark Borgschulte and Guillermo Marshall are co–authors in this chapter.
1The CDC and its researchers have issued regular reports on the rise in drug overdoses, as in Paulozzi et al. (2011),
Jones, Mack and Paulozzi (2013), and Rudd et al. (2016). Maxwell (2011) reviews the literature.
2Volkow and McLellan (2016) reviews the literature on opioid abuse and the rise in chronic pain. Phillips (2014)
reports on the rising trend in suicides. Case and Deaton (2015b) find a strong association between pain and suicide
using data from the Gallup surveys; from their paper: “The suicide epidemic in middle age is the tip of an iceberg of
mortality and morbidity, especially pain, among middle-aged Americans.”
3The research on supply-side policies has generally found them to have, at best, temporary effects on prices and
usage of illicit substances; for example, see DiNardo (1993) and Dobkin and Nicosia (2009). Swensen (2015) provides
demand-side evidence and for further citations to the literature.
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abuse and suicide. We identify supply shocks using the passage of state legislation that implements
a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMPs), one of the primary policy tools used to combat
the prescription drug abuse epidemic. PDMPs require pharmacies to report the names of both
the patient and prescriber to a central database when dispensing potentially addictive prescription
drugs, and have expanded from 12 to 49 states since 1999, reflecting their importance in the policy
response to the epidemic. While early studies of PDMPs found mixed evidence for their efficacy,
recent research has found their implementation to result in reductions in the prescribing of opioids
with the highest potential for abuse (i.e. drugs classified in Schedule II), fewer prescriptions written
to those receiving drugs from many doctors or dispensers, improvements in time required for drug
diversion investigations, and reductions in overdose deaths.4 PDMPs vary in their details, and
have been passed in standalone bills, as well as in legislation that includes measures to combat pill
mills and doctor shopping, and regulate pain management clinics. We assume these programs, and
related legislation, make it more difficult for addicts to maintain a regular supply of prescription
drugs, acting as a negative supply shock to the market for diverted drugs. However, these supply-
side restrictions on the availability of prescription drugs are not usually combined with demand-
side expansions in treatment services. For example, we find no response in the number of treatment
facilities at or around the time of PDMP implementation.5 Thus, we hypothesize that these policy-
induced supply shocks have the potential to lead to undesirable outcomes, such as suicide, in places
where treatment services are unavailable to meet this new demand. In the remainder of the paper,
we refer to these supply shocks as “PDMPs.”
To better understand the response to these policies, we propose a dynamic model that describes
how a supply shock affects an addict’s choice between continued drug use, effort put towards
quitting, and suicide. We model suicide as a rational choice (as in Hamermesh and Soss 1974,
Cutler, Glaeser and Norberg 2000, and Koo and Cox 2008), within the constraints imposed by
addiction. In the model, suicide occurs when the drug habit becomes unsustainable—for instance,
due to restrictions on access to the drug—and also when the addict’s non-withdrawal pain becomes
intolerable—for instance, due to emotional pain or depression. In line with existing research, we
assume the latter is beyond the control of a drug user and we call it inherent risk, as it is not
4Buchmueller and Carey (2018) provides evidence on the reduction in supply to heavy users who are most likely to
be addicts. See Reisman et al. (2009), Reifler et al. (2012), Finklea, Sacco and Bagalman (2014), Kilby (2015), Meara
et al. (2016), Patrick et al. (2016), and Moyo et al. (2017) for further evidence on the effects of PDMPs. We address
heterogeneity in PDMP legislation, specifically the role of mandatory access provisions, in the analysis. Missouri is
the only state which has not passed a PDMP.
5In addition, Jones, Mack and Paulozzi (2013) reports that the number of patients treated at methadone clinics has
not changed in the last decade. Anecdotal evidence in Vestal (2016) suggests that methadone-prescribing clinics have
not expanded during the epidemic, and as a result, have long waiting lists and difficulty in keeping up with the demand
for their services.
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necessarily related to having lost access to the drug.6 Addicts also choose how much effort to exert
towards recovery which, combined with the efficacy of drug addiction treatment, determines the
rate of recovered addicts. Thus, addicts have two possible paths out of addiction: drug addiction
treatment or suicide.
In the model, PDMPs reduce the frequency with which drugs arrive, which in turn reduces the
value of using the drug, as the withdrawal symptoms are alleviated less frequently. The effect of
PDMPs on the value of using the drug has two effects on suicides, reflecting the two paths out
of addiction. First, it causes some drug habits to become unsustainable, triggering an increase in
the rate of suicides. Second, it makes recovery more attractive relative to using the drug, which
increases the equilibrium levels of effort with which addicts seek recovery. More effort increases
the likelihood of recovery, which reduces the number of people exposed to the inherent risk of
using the drug. The model predicts that a greater drug treatment effectiveness or availability re-
duces the first effect, while it intensifies the second effect (i.e., it makes each unit of effort more
productive). Together, these competing effects lead to the conclusion that suicides may increase
following the introduction of PDMPs in places where drug treatment is unavailable (e.g., places
fewer drug abuse treatment centers or limited availability of opioid-replacement therapy), while
suicides may decrease with PDMPs where drug treatment is more effective. The net effect on
suicides is ambiguous.
We evaluate the model in an empirical analysis, using variation generated by the introduction
of PDMPs between 1999 and 2014. We focus the analysis on middle-aged white non-Hispanics,
the group driving the trends in both drug overdose and suicide (see Figure 2.1), but also consider
effects on the entire population and other subgroups. Identification comes from the timing of the
passage of PDMPs, in conjunction with variation in the availability of treatment services at both
the county and state level. We measure treatment availability by both the number of drug treatment
facilities and by the frequency with which medication-assisted therapies are used. The data come
from several sources, including deaths by overdose and suicide from the Vital Statistics System
Multiple Causes of Death Microdata Files, prescription drug sales obtained through Freedom of
Information Act requests to the US Drug Enforcement Administration, and drug treatment facilities
information from the National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS) and
County Business Patterns.
Our primary analysis examines how suicide responds to the passage of a state PDMP in counties
6Previous research in economics finds that the supply of drugs and alcohol can affect suicide rates (Carpenter
2004, Anderson, Rees and Sabia 2014). See Kuramoto et al. (2012) and Ilgen et al. (2016) for evidence showing an
association between prescription drug abuse and suicidal attempts as well as Fischer et al. (2005) for evidence showing
an association between prescription drug abuse and depression. These studies do not address causality.
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with differing availability of treatment facilities. Consistent with the model, we find PDMPs reduce
suicides in counties with high availability of drug addiction treatment facilities relative to counties
with low levels of treatment facilities. The heterogeneous effects of PDMPs grow stronger when
we consider only those reforms which included a mandatory access provision requiring doctors
to check the state database before prescribing any monitored drug.7 As the county-level analysis
includes state by year fixed effects, the analysis controls for local trends in economic shocks,
the availability of substitute drugs, and other concurrent state-level policy changes that are not
associated with the penetration of treatment centers. A closely-related paper to ours, Swensen
(2015), finds that expansions of treatment services lowers mortality, including suicide. Taken
together, the evidence points to an important role for treatment services in reducing mortality in
this population.
We then turn to a parallel analysis of the mortality response to the passage of PDMPs in a
state-quarter panel. This model uses almost entirely independent variation from the county-level
analysis, and also allows us to extend the heterogeneity analysis to include interactions with mea-
sures of medication-assisted therapy. Medication-assisted therapy is the medically-recommended
method of drug treatment; however, many states and treatment service providers mandate “cold-
turkey” methods be used in publicly-funded clinics, which make up a majority of treatment facil-
ities. Consistent with the county-level analysis, we find PDMPs decrease suicides in states with
more facilities, as well as in states where doctors are more likely to prescribe the opiate replace-
ments methadone and buprenorphine. These dimensions of heterogeneity (treatment facilities and
opiate replacement prescribing rates) appear to be long-run characteristics of the states, rather than
endogenous responses to the epidemic themselves.
Thus, we conclude that the availability of these drugs influences suicide rates, and access to
effective treatment services can complement supply-side restrictions.
Our study makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, we provide some of the first
quasi-experimental evidence on the links between the concurrent rise in prescription drug abuse
and suicides among white non-Hispanics. Suicide rates can show a persistent decrease following
reductions in the supply of prescription drugs in places where addicts have a path out. Whether the
decrease comes through changes in the behavior of addicts, as proposed in our model, or through
the reduction in the number of addicts, the response implies there is an inherent risk of suicide
associated with prescription drug abuse. Put another way, the concurrent rise in prescription drug
abuse and suicides are causally associated. This finding has broad implications for theories that
7Buchmueller and Carey (2018) find mandatory access to be the most important feature of PDMPs in predicting a
decrease in drug sales to the Medicare patients likely to be addicts.
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seek to explain one or both trends.8
Second, we contribute to the broader literature on drug policy by highlighting interactions of
supply and demand in drug policy. Policy and research have long focused on supply-side measures,
of which PDMPs are merely the latest example. Economists have criticized the focus on supply-
side interventions as short-sighted, and likely to fail due to the role of demand for these products
(Becker, Murphy and Grossman, 2004). Our findings demonstrate the complementarity between
supply-side and demand-side policies in combating drug abuse. In this aspect, we believe our
results are the first of their kind.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the economics of suicide. Our theoretical model explains
the puzzling decrease in suicides in places where drug treatment is more available or effective.
Our empirical and theoretical results jointly suggest that drug users respond to incentives when
choosing whether to seek drug treatment, as well as the importance of treatment effectiveness for
the choices of drug users. If suicide can be taken as a measure of the welfare of drug addicts, our
findings demonstrate that reductions in the supply of addictive drugs can, in some circumstances,
increase the welfare of addicts.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides background on the prescription drug
epidemic and policy responses to it as well as a description of the data. Section 2.2 presents a
theoretical framework that shows how a supply shock interacted with a demand response may cause
suicide to decline in places with strong addiction-help networks. Our econometric framework is
discussed in section 2.3. In section 2.4, we present results that suggest that the supply shock
created by PDMPs did cause suicide to decline in places with strong addiction-help networks, and
prescription drug abuse is inherently risky. Lastly, in section 2.5, we discuss broader implications
of our findings and some limitations of our analysis.
2.1 Background: Policy, Data and the Supply Shock
2.1.1 The Prescription Drug Epidemic and Policy Responses
Deaths from unintentional drug overdoses in the United States have risen by 500 percent since the
early 1990s, and are now the second-leading cause of accidental death (Okie, 2010). According to
the CDC, the trend in overdoses is largely explained by the rise in prescription drug use and abuse,
8Although we argue that our evidence establishes a causal link, PDMPs have had only modest effects on the supply
of drugs, limiting our ability to assess the total contribution of the rise in prescription drug abuse to the rise in suicide.
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and in particular, with the increase in the use of opioid analgesics (Rudd et al., 2016). By 2007, this
class of drugs was responsible for more deaths by unintentional overdose than heroin and cocaine
combined. The most affected demographic and age group is non-Hispanic whites between the ages
of 20 and 64.9
The origins of the epidemic are multifaceted. While reported pain and the prevalence of chronic
pain have been rising, the underlying causes of these trends are not clear (Case and Deaton, 2015b).
A growing literature suggests the epidemic is related to the prescribing behavior of physicians. In
the time series, the emergence of the epidemic is tied to the 1990s change in standards of care
which expanded the use of heavy-dosage and often long-lasting opioid medication to a much wider
class of patients.10 Observational studies have found that patients prescribed higher doses are more
likely to overdose (Bohnert et al., 2011). Despite suggestive evidence that the epidemic is at least
partly iatrogenic or supply-driven, other evidence finds a strong association between the abuse
of prescription drugs and other substance abuse disorders (McCabe, Cranford and West, 2008).
Recent research suggests that prescription drug abuse may be partly responsible for the rise in
heroin overdose deaths (Lankenau et al. 2012, Peavy et al. 2012, Jones 2013, Alpert, Powell and
Pacula 2017, Evans, Lieber and Power 2017).
One of the most common state-level policy response to the epidemic has been the introduction
of prescription drug monitoring programs.11 PDMPs require dispensers to report the identity of the
patient, prescribing health care provider and dispenser to a statewide system at the time a monitored
drug is dispensed. The information then enters a statewide database, which can be accessed in
several circumstances. The primary users of the database are prescribing physicians, who can
check whether patients have received a monitored drug from another source. Law enforcement
in most states can also access the database, speeding up investigations of drug diversion. Many,
but not all, state databases are linked through a system of interstate sharing. The effect of PDMPs
on the overall prescribing of regulated drugs is ambiguous, as it allows more precise targeting of
drugs to non-addicts.12 However, PDMPs are unambiguously designed to reduce the supply of
prescriptions to drug addicts. We discuss evidence on the efficacy of PDMPs, below.
The specifics of PDMPs differ between states, and PDMP legislation may also include or co-
9Low-education and urban populations are also more affected. See Paulozzi et al. (2012) for details on demographic
composition of overdoses.
10Remarkably, this change occurred despite a lack of evidence on the efficacy of long-term opiate medication for
the treatment of chronic pain. Specifically, there is no randomized evidence from studies with follow-ups longer than
3 months (Chou et al., 2015).
11Heather Grey of NAMSDL provided some information that appears in the following paragraphs in personal com-
munication. All errors and omissions are our own.
12Baehren et al. (2010) finds the introduction of the Ohio PDMP altered prescribing of opioids in 41 percent of
emergency department cases, with significant shares of patients receiving either fewer or more opioid medication.
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incide with other, related interventions. Other state-level policy responses include changes to the
security of prescription forms, pain clinic laws, crackdowns on pill mills, increased regulation of
pain management clinics, ID requirements, and drug courts. PDMPs have received the majority of
the attention in the policy literature, and we know of no paper which attempts to account for the
individual contribution of the full range of policy changes. For these reasons, we do not attempt to
evaluate the effect of PDMPs per se, and instead focus on the interplay of supply shocks, suicide,
and treatment, as emphasized by the model. We use the implementation of PDMPs from 1999
through 2015 to identify the timing of these supply shocks.
Several features of PDMPs and related legislation deserve mention, as they are important to our
identification. First, the timing of PDMP implementation appears to be unrelated to recent trends
in the severity of the epidemic, as measured by drug overdoses. Although they represent one
of the major policy tools used to combat the epidemic, the exact timing of their passage has been
determined by the status of previous (usually paper-based) programs, internet penetration (required
to run the electronic registration system), and state-level political developments. The apparent
randomness in the timing of passage may be related to our exclusion of those states which pass
laws before the analysis window, who presumably have the highest propensities to pass PDMPs.
Second, PDMPs also appear to have little relationship with the availability of treatment services.
PDMPs are supply-side interventions, and a review of PDMP legislation in the sample period
has found none that included expanded funding for or access to treatment services. We further
substantiate the lack of important coincident demand-side interventions by testing for an empirical
relationship between the passage of PDMPs and the number of treatment centers in a state. We find
no relationship between PDMP legislation and number of treatment centers, either before or after
the legislation. Third, federal law prohibits the inclusion of treatment-based provision of drugs in
state PDMPs. Thus, we do not worry that the passage of PDMPs directly affects the option to go
to drug treatment.
The literature on the efficacy of PDMPs has proceeded from the measurement of total sales of
regulated drugs and other aggregate outcomes, to more focused studies of the effects on heavy
users and of key program characteristics. Most studies in the first category find mixed or no effect
of PDMPs on aggregate outcomes. For example, a recent large scale study, Meara et al. (2016),
finds weak evidence of effects of state laws, including PDMPs, on drug sales. Using Medicare data,
Meara et al. (2016) finds no effect of the average state-level reform during the 2006-2012 period;
suggestive evidence showing reductions in sales do not survive corrections for multiple hypothesis
testing. These results contrast with Moyo et al. (2017), which finds significant reductions in the
total volume of opioids dispensed to Medicare patients following implementation of PDMPs.
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These studies of aggregate outcomes may be misleading if there are changes in the composition
of patients or prescribed drugs. For example, one of the more consistent findings in the recent
literature is that PDMPs cause doctors to substitute away from Schedule II drugs, which have the
highest potential for addiction.13 If doctors continue prescribing opiates, but shift patients to drugs
with lower value to addicts, PDMPs may affect the supply of diverted drugs more than average
prescriptions and sales.
A second wave of studies has focused more closely on the groups targeted by PDMPs, and spe-
cific elements of the programs. One of the largest and most comprehensive studies of prescribing
behavior, Buchmueller and Carey (2018), uses Medicare Part D data from 2007-2012 to examine
patients’ prescription histories. This paper finds that PDMPs have the intended effect on supply,
reducing the percentage of enrollees who obtain prescriptions from five or more physicians by
more than 8 percent and from five or more pharmacies by more than 15 percent, with no effect on
the mean of the utilization distribution. The paper also finds an important role for the details of
the programs, especially when prescribers are mandated to access the database before prescribing.
Our approach to identifying the effect of PDMPs follows this paper closely. Consistent with the
empirical strategy in Buchmueller and Carey (2018), Patrick et al. (2016) examines variation in
overdose outcomes that result from the passage of PDMPs with differing characteristics. The ev-
idence in this paper supports a broader effect of PDMPs, with reductions in overdoses associated
with the passage of PDMPs with characteristics beyond mandatory access, such as the frequency
with which the data is updated, and whether the state monitors four or more of the DEA drug
schedules. Similarly, Pardo (2017) finds that more stringent PDMPs result in larger reductions in
opioid overdoses in a 1999-2014 sample period, and that mandatory access is not the only program
characteristic that matters. While these studies cover different sample periods and reach differ-
ent conclusions on the key features of PDMPs, taken together, they provide strong evidence that
PDMPs reduce in opiates available in the market for diverted drugs.
2.1.2 Data
To measure the impact of PDMPs and associated reforms on the supply of drugs and suicides
we use a variety of data sources. The primary outcome of interest, suicides, is drawn from the
National Vital Statistics System’s (NVSS) Multiple Causes of Death Microdata that contain all
certified deaths occurred in the US at the county level. The data report the manner of death and the
13For evidence on Schedule II prescriptions, see Bao et al. (2016), Moyo et al. (2017), and Wen et al. (2017).
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underlying cause of death14 as well as demographic information such as race, ethnicity, gender,
age and education. We aggregate the data at the county–year or state–quarter level and restrict
attention to years 1999 to 2014 for two reasons: availability of other data and changes in death
diagnosis codes in 1999.
Information on the date of user access to PDMP is obtained from reports of the National Al-
liance for Model State Drug Laws (NAMSDL).15 As in Kilby (2015), we only take states with
programs implemented after the Model Prescription Monitoring Program Act of 2003 (a total of
38 states). This restricts attention to PDMPs that are comparable in terms of physician access to
patient prescription information, as outlined in the Act’s guidelines.
We use state and county-level measures to test the heterogeneity results implied by our theoret-
ical model with respect to treatment availability. The first is the total number of substance abuse
treatment facilities (private and public) in each state, which we gather from the annual reports of
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)16 available through
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The second are state-
level measures of drug distribution for methadone and buprenorphine from Drug Enforcement
Administration’s (DEA) Automated Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS), which
measure the availability of opioid-replacement therapy. Lastly, we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s
County Business Patterns (CBP) to collect county-level information on the number of substance
abuse treatment centers.17
2.2 A Model of Drug Use, Treatment Effectiveness, and Suicide
In this section, we develop a dynamic model to understand how the supply shock caused by PDMPs
affects an addict’s choice between continued drug use, drug addiction treatment, and suicide. We
analyze the choices made by an addict once an addict and assume that the entry of new addicts
14Suicides are identified as those records where manner of death is equal to suicide, regardless of the underlying
cause of death. Opioid–related overdose are identified using the underlying and multiple cause of death information,
and they correspond to those records where T40.2 (‘Other opioids’) is mentioned. Therefore our measure of suicide
includes all possible underlying cause of death: drugs, firearm, suffocation, among others; while our overdose measure
includes all manners of death: suicide, accidental, homicide, among others.
15See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for details on the dates of user access to PDMP.
16N-SSATS is a voluntary census of all known drug and alcohol abuse treatment facilities in the U.S. In 2015,
around 95% of the existent facilities responded the survey. The facilities include outpatient, inpatient and clinics that
provide drug and alcohol treatment. The survey excludes patients of solo practice and facilities treating incarcerated
patients.
17Following Swensen (2015), we label all establishments with NACIS codes 621420 and 623220 as substance abuse
treatment centers.
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follows an exogenous process.18 In the model, suicide is a choice caused by the pain created
by the drug habit (e.g., withdrawal symptoms and emotional pain). Suicides arise when the drug
habit becomes unsustainable—for instance, due to a drug supply shock—or when the addict’s non-
withdrawal pain escalates beyond tolerable levels (e.g., due to depression or emotional pain). We
assume the latter is beyond the control of a drug addict and we call it inherent risk, as it is not
necessarily related to having lost access to the drug. Addicts also choose how much effort to exert
towards drug addiction recovery which, combined with treatment efficacy, determines the rate of
recovered addicts.
The main results we test in the data are related to the effects of a drug supply shock on suicides.
On the one hand, a drug supply shock causes some drug habits to become unsustainable, leading
to an increase in the number of suicides. On the other hand, a drug supply shock makes using the
drug less attractive, increasing the relative attractiveness of drug addiction recovery, in particular,
in places with strong addiction-help networks. The second effect increases the effort devoted to
recovery, reducing the number of people exposed to the inherent risk of the drug and, hence, the
rate of suicides. This second effect, however, only arises where the addiction-help network is
sufficiently strong, implying that the supply shock caused by PDMPs may increase the suicide rate
in places where treatment is unavailable, while potentially reduce the suicide rate in places where
effective treatment is widely available.
2.2.1 Baseline
Consider an infinite horizon continuous time model describing the behavior of an addict. At every
instant in time, addicts continue using the drug unless they recover after drug addiction treatment
or choose to commit suicide. Following Hamermesh and Soss (1974), Cutler, Glaeser and Norberg
(2000), and Koo and Cox (2008), we assume that suicide is chosen when the value of using the
drug falls bellow 0 (i.e., normalized value of suicide). Conditional on choosing to continue using
the drug, the addict chooses how much effort to exert towards seeking drug addiction recovery.
An addict faces withdrawal symptoms, w, that are only alleviated with the arrival of a drug
dose (and the utility of using the drug, u), which happens at an addict-specific Poisson rate, λ. In
order for the habit to be sustainable, the rate of arrival of drug doses, λ, must be sufficiently high,
otherwise, the benefits of using the drug are surpassed by pain. When the habit is unsustainable,
the addict commits suicide. An addict chooses an effort level e with which to seek recovery, where
effort combined with treatment efficacy (or strength of the addiction-help network), π, determine
18Exogeneous entry and other assumptions are discussed in Subsection 2.2.3.
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the likelihood of recovery. We assume that the value of being a recovered addict is given by R.
Addicts face an inherent risk, as emotional pain escalates at Poisson rate α, making the value of
using the drug fall below the value of suicide, leading drug users to commit suicide. It is important
to note that this inherent risk is independent of drug consumption. These last assumptions are
consistent with studies showing an association between prescription drug abuse and both suicidal
thoughts and depression problems (Kuramoto et al. 2012, Ilgen et al. 2016, Fischer et al. 2005).
Finally, addicts discount future payoffs at rate r ≥ 0.19
We restrict the parameters of the model in two ways. The first restriction guarantees that drug
addicts have incentives to recover from drug addiction in places where drug addiction treatment is
effective. In absence of this restriction, our model would be unable to capture the fact that some
drug addicts attempt to recover in real life. The second restriction guarantees that drug use exists
in equilibrium. That is, under this restriction at least some drug users prefer to use the drug over
committing suicide. These parameter restrictions are stated in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1.
i) R(α+ r)>−w+λu
ii) −w+λu+π2R2/2 > 0.
We focus on a stationary equilibrium by using a continuous time dynamic programming ap-






−w+λu+ eπ(R−V )− c(e)−αV,0
}
, (2.1)
where the first value in the max operator is the flow value of an addict who chooses to continue
using the drug, while the second, the (normalized) flow value of suicide. Since the environment
is stationary, we have that V > 0 as long as the rate of arrival of drug doses is sufficiently high,
λ > λ∗(π,R,u), where λ∗(π,R,u) is characterized below. Addicts with λ < λ∗(π,R,u) have drug
habits that are unsustainable—i.e., the pain caused by the habit surpasses the utility gained from
using the drug—leading them to choose to commit suicide.
To understand the flow value of an addict who chooses to continue using the drug, we have that
the addict experiences withdrawal symptoms−w at every instant of time; the addict finds a dose of
the drug at Poisson rate λ and gains utility u from using the drug; the addict becomes a recovered
addict at Poisson rate eπ, earning the addict an incremental value (R−V ), where e is effort, π is a
measure of drug addiction treatment efficacy, and R is the value of a recovered addict; the addict
19Our results hold for arbitrary values of r. That is, even when drug addicts heavily discount the future.
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pays the effort cost of seeking recovery, c(e) = e2/2; and faces the inherent risk at Poisson rate α,
which leads to suicide and a change in value equal to (0−V ).
When V > 0, we have that the addict chooses effort according to
c′(e∗) = π(R−V ) if R >V (2.2)
and e∗ = 0 if R≤V . The equation shows that drug addicts equalize the marginal cost and marginal
benefit of an extra unit of effort. The marginal benefit of seeking drug addiction recovery is the
value increment gained when becoming recovered multiplied by the level of treatment effectiveness
(π), where the level of treatment effectiveness can be thought of as the productivity of each unit of
effort. Replacing (2.2) into (2.1), gives an implicit expression for the equilibrium value of V in an
equilibrium with positive effort (i.e., R−V > 0)
rV =−w+λu+π2(R−V )2/2−αV. (2.3)
While equation (2.3) has two solutions, only one of the solutions is consistent with an equilibrium





which is guaranteed to hold under Assumption 1(ii).
The cumulative probability that an addict commits suicide by time t is given by






where t is time measured from the moment when the addict became an addict. From the equation
we can note that the long run probability of suicide for the individual is given by α/(α+e∗π). The
dynamics of the cumulative probability of suicide are illustrated in Figure 2.2 (curve A).
If at every instant of time there is a measure µ > 0 of new addicts, with each addict drawing
θ = {α,λ,w,u} from a stationary distribution F , then the expected number of suicides at every
instant of time is given by





20Under Assumption 1, R > V (e = 0) = (−w+λu)/(r+α). That is, the value of recovery exceeds the value of a
drug user who sets e = 0. This rules out the possibility of V > R and guarantees that e∗ > 0 in equilibrium.
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2.2.2 Supply Shocks, Treatment Effectiveness, and Suicides
Consider an exogenous change in the Poisson rate at which a drug user has access to the drug, λ.
A decrease in λ reduces the value of using the drug, as withdrawal symptoms are alleviated less
frequently. This change will have two effects. On the one hand, it may make the habit unsustainable
for some addicts (i.e., λ may fall bellow λ∗), which would increase the number of suicides. On
the other hand, by affecting the value of using the drug, it changes the incentives to exert effort
towards seeking drug addiction recovery. Since effort is determined, in part, by the incremental
value of becoming recovered, R−V , a lower value of V makes becoming recovered relatively more






α+ r+π2(R−V ) < 0.
How much the supply shock boosts incentives to exert effort depends also on treatment effec-





(α+ r+π2(R−V ))3 < 0,
suggesting that a lower value of λ will create a higher effort response for greater values of π,
as a greater value of π increases the productivity of those extra units of effort, providing further
incentives to exert effort. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Suicide rate and exogenous changes to drug access). An exogenous decrease in λ
(i.e., drug access) has two effects on the suicide rate:
i) Negative effect: It increases the effort devoted to seeking drug addiction recovery, which
lowers the suicide rate by reducing the number of people exposed to the inherent risk of
using the drug. (Curve B1 in Figure 2.2.)
ii) Positive effect: It causes addicts to fall below the habit sustainability threshold, λ∗, leading
them to commit suicide. (Curve B2 in Figure 2.2.)
A greater effectiveness or availability of drug addiction treatment, π, intensifies the negative
effect and mitigates the positive effect on the suicide rate, leading to a potential overall decrease
in the number of suicides when drug access is reduced. On the other hand, the negative effect is
non-existent when drug addiction treatment is unavailable (i.e., π = 0), implying that a decrease in
drug access will increase the suicide rate where treatment is ineffective.
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Lastly, the model also makes predictions about the role played by treatment effectiveness on








r+α+π2(R−V ) > 0,
as an increase in π makes each unit of effort become more productive. The following proposition
summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 (Suicides and treatment effectiveness). An increase in the effectiveness or availabil-
ity of drug addiction treatment (i.e., an increase in π) increases equilibrium effort. Higher effort
combined with higher drug addiction treatment effectiveness, increases the rate of recovery, e∗π,
and, hence, lowers the number of suicides.
2.2.3 Discussion
As discussed above, PDMPs may limit drug users’ access to their drugs (i.e., lower value of λ).
This is especially true for drug abusers who rely on several physicians or the illegal market to
satisfy their needs. Proposition 1 implies that the effect of PDMPs on the suicide rate may be
either negative or positive. Wherever there is a strong addiction-help network, PDMPs may create
greater incentives to seek recovery, leading to a higher rate of recovered addicts which are no longer
exposed to the inherent risk of using the drug. On the other hand, in places with a weak addiction-
help network, PDMPs may make using the drug too painful and, without hope of recovery, lead
to a greater suicide rate. The model illustrates how a supply shock combined with a consumer
response may cause the suicide rate to decline in places where addicts have access to a strong help
network.
Elements that are absent from the model include drug substitution, endogenous entry, and un-
certainty about whether supply shocks will be reversed. One might think that when faced with a
drug supply shock, addicts may choose to consume a substitute drug (e.g., heroin). While sub-
stitution caused by a supply shock is not formally present in the model, one may incorporate it
into the model in reduced form by allowing the supply shock to have heterogeneous effects across
individuals depending on how easily they can substitute to other drugs.21 Substitution ease might
be explained, for instance, by idiosyncratic physiological factors or heterogeneity in search tech-
nology. As long as substitution is less than perfect, the results above—while mitigated—still hold.
21Heterogeneous supply shocks can be captured by changes in λ that differ across individuals.
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The model does not allow for a supply shock to change the rate of entry of new addicts. Since
the PDMP supply shock is specific to prescription drugs, the value of abusing a prescription drug
relative to the value of abusing a non-prescription drug (e.g., heroin) decreases with the policy
intervention, which would endogenously increase entry into using non-prescription drugs. Under
the plausible assumption that non-prescription drugs have a higher inherent risk, our results would
still hold in a model with endogenous entry although a supply shock would make an increase in
suicides likelier due to substitution towards more dangerous drugs. The effort channel however
would still have to be present for one to see a decline in suicides after a supply shock.
Lastly, the model does not incorporate uncertainty about whether the drug supply shock caused
by PDMPs will be reversed in the future. Both theoretical and empirical work have argued that
uncertainty about the future can shape suicide decisions (Campaniello, Diasakos and Mastrobuoni,
2017).
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Following the theoretical model, our empirical analysis has two parts. First, we study how PDMPs
differentially impact suicide rates based on treatment availability at the county–year level. Second,
we study the causal effect of the supply shock caused by PDMPs on suicides at the state–quarter
level, allowing for heterogeneous effects along a drug treatment-efficacy dimension. Throughout
the analysis, we date the introduction of PDMPs using the date the databases became accessible
to prescribers.22 We focus the analysis in the main text on the middle-aged and older white non-
Hispanic population identified by Case and Deaton (2015a). This demographic group has some
of the highest rates of prescription drug use and suicide in the population, which also serves to
increase the power of our tests. We report results for all races and ages in the Appendix B.
These exercises are based on the premise that drug users’ suicide choices are affected by the sup-
ply shock caused by PDMPs (see Proposition 1).23 To quantify the effect of PDMPs on suicides
we use two approaches. The first is linear regressions where the dependent variable is the loga-
rithm of the number of suicides and, the second is Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimators
(QMLE) where the dependent variable is the number of suicides (Wedderburn 1974, McCullagh
1983, Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon 1984, Cameron and Trivedi 1986, Wooldridge 1997).
For the Poisson models, we use a QMLE estimator instead of a maximum likelihood estimator
22See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for dates and other details.
23Our estimates are reduced form in that we do not directly observe the magnitude of the supply shock. See
Buchmueller and Carey (2018), along with other citations in the introduction, for the effect of PDMPs on drug sales.
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(MLE) because the former does not impose the full structure of the Poisson distribution for esti-
mation (i.e., the mean is not required to be equal to the variance), allowing for general variance
structures which, for instance, can accommodate overdispersion as well as correlated error struc-
tures. Moreover, the QMLE only requires a correctly specified distribution mean for it to deliver
consistent estimates for the mean, whereas alternative methods for count data (e.g., the negative
binomial maximum likelihood estimator) require the full distribution to be correctly specified for
consistency.
The first part of the analysis studies the differential impact of PDMPs by treatment center avail-
ability at the county–year level. The theoretical model predicts that a drug supply shock interacts
with treatment availability in determining the impact of the supply shock on the suicide rate. To
test this prediction in our empirical model, we allow for an interaction between PDMP indicators
and the number (i.e. the level) of treatment centers in the county, which captures how the PDMPs’
supply shocks differentially affect counties based on their treatment center availability. In our
linear regressions, the logarithm of suicides is modeled as
logsuicidesc,t = θc + γs(c),t +βFacilitiesc,t−1 +δ1{PDMPs(c),t}Facilitiesc,t−1 + εc,t , (2.5)
while in our Poisson models, the county–year mean suicide count, µc,t , is modeled as
logµc,t = θc + γs(c),t +βFacilitiesc,t−1 +δ1{PDMPs(c),t}Facilitiesc,t−1, (2.6)
where θc and γs(c),t are county and state–year fixed effects; 1{PDMPs(c),t} is an indicator variable
that takes the value one if county c’s state s had already implemented a PDMP by year t; and
Facilitiesc,t is the number of substance abuse treatment facilities in county c in year t. To give a
meaningful scale to this variable, we divide the raw number of facilities by the standard deviation
weighted by population, 77.54 facilities. In these models, the coefficients of interest are δ and
β. δ captures how PDMPs differentially impact suicide as a function of treatment availability; β
captures the main effect of how treatment availability impacts the suicide rate. We also present
an event study version of the linear model by interacting the PDMP indicator with a dummy for
states with high or low availability of facilities. Proposition 1 predicts that after a supply shock,
the suicide rate decreases by more in places with greater treatment availability (i.e., δ < 0). Propo-
sition 2 predicts β < 0, as greater treatment availability increases the productivity of each unit of
effort, leading to a greater recovery rate (all else equal). We weight by the population to generate
representative estimates and to increase efficiency. We report standard errors that are robust to
within-state correlation in the error terms.
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In the second part of the analysis, the unit of observation is a state–quarter combination. In our
linear regressions, the logarithm of suicides is modeled as
logsuicidess,t = θs + γt +δ11{PDMPs,t}+δ21{PDMPs,t}Xs,t−1 +δ3Xs,t−1 + εs,t , (2.7)
while in our Poisson models, the state–quarter mean suicide count, µs,t , is modeled as
logµs,t = θs + γt +δ11{PDMPs,t}+δ21{PDMPs,t}Xs,t−1 +δ3Xs,t−1, (2.8)
where θs and γt are state and quarter fixed effects; 1{PDMPs,t} is an indicator variable that takes
the value one if state s had already implemented a PDMP by year–quarter t; Xs,t−1 is the value of a
covariate measuring the strength of the addiction help network for state s in t−1. The interaction
term 1{PDMPs,t}Xs,t−1 allows for PDMPs to have a heterogeneous effect on suicides, allowing us
to test the predictions that supply shocks may lower the suicide rate in places with greater treatment
availability. In these empirical models, the coefficients of interest are δ1 and δ2. Since both of these
models are in logs, we can interpret δ1 +δ2Xs,t−1 as the proportionate change in mean suicides as
a consequence of the PDMP implementation. We again use population weights and cluster at the
state level.
Crucially, the state–quarter and county–year strategies exploit entirely independent variation for
identification. Identification in the state–quarter framework would be compromised by concurrent
reforms in state policy that also affect suicide rates. To address this, the county–year model absorbs
the state-level variation used to identify the state–quarter model, through the use of state–year fixed
effects. Thus, the county-level model explicitly controls for state-level changes over time, greatly
reducing the potential set of confounders. Similarly, the state-level model implicitly aggregates the
data on the location of drug treatment centers, addressing any endogeneity between their within-
state location and suicides. Thus, the two empirical approaches serve as independent tests on
patterns predicted by the theoretical model.
2.4 Effects of PDMPs and Drug Treatment on Suicides
2.4.1 Trends and Descriptive Statistics
To illustrate the rapid increase in suicides among white non-Hispanics over 30 years old, we plot
in Figure 2.1 the evolution of suicides by race, and suicides of white non-Hispanics by age group.
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As can be seen in Panel A, the rate of deaths per 100,000 residents24 for white non-Hispanics
is much larger than for other races, and has increased in 44 percent from 1999 to 2014. When
we decompose the increase for white non-Hispanics by age group, we observe that the 45-54 age
range are the most affected group, with a growth rate of 66 percent (Panel B). This group was
highlighted in Case and Deaton (2015a). As for suicides of white non-Hispanics in other ages,
there is an increase over the study period, but not as pronounced as for the mentioned group. Our
main specification uses the aggregate of all white non-Hispanic over 30 years old.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of suicides25, overdoses, access to opioids, and drug-
treatment related variables. Panel A of the table shows that there are on average 9.8 suicides in a
county–year. However, suicides committed by other means besides drugs are the main component
of the total number of suicides, being the mean of non-overdose suicides 8.3 in a county–year.26
Likewise, the average rate of opioid overdose deaths is smaller than the average suicide rate, with a
mean of 8.6 at the county–year level. As for the distribution of opiates, at the state level there were
on average 135 milligrams morphine equivalent of oxycodone, a commonly abused prescription
opiate, while of buprenorphine and methadone there were only 21.6mg and 2.4mg per person.
With respect to drug treatment, counties have on average 5.9 facilities in the study period.
2.4.2 PDMPs and Suicides
The primary empirical results appear in Table 2.2, where we present county–year level estimates
for the differential impact of PDMPs by treatment center availability. The first three columns
present estimates for the linear model, and the last three present estimates for the Poisson model.27
All the specifications include state by year fixed effects, which address a number of identification
threats including local economic trends, the availability of substitute drugs, and other concurrent
state-level policy changes (e.g., state budget for health care).28 In a subset of the specifications,
we interact the PDMP indicator with the number of treatment centers in each county (in standard
24Computed as the number of deaths per 100,000 population by race.
25Includes non-drug related suicides and drug related suicides.
26For example intentional self-harm by handgun, hanging or sharp objects. To compute this variable we remove
from the total number of suicides those with codes X60-X64 which are related with drug use.
27The first three columns include fewer observations as the log transformation drops county–year combinations with
a zero suicide count.
28The state by year fixed effects also capture drug addicts’ beliefs about whether the drug supply shock will be
reversed in a given state. As argued in Section 2.2, the possibility of a reversal impacts drug addicts’ incentives to
commit suicide and exert effort towards drug addiction recovery.
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deviations) to measure heterogeneity along the treatment availability dimension.29
Columns 1 and 4 (Table 2.2) show that a one standard deviation greater availability of treatment
centers is associated with about a four to five percent decrease in suicides.30 Columns 2 and 5
interact the number of facilities with PDMP indicators. The coefficients reveal that PDMPs have a
more negative impact on suicides in places with a greater number of treatment centers. We estimate
that an additional standard deviation in treatment centers is associated with about a 1.6 percent
decrease in suicides after the passage of a PDMP. In Figure 2.3, we report the event study version
of this specification. The difference between high and low states is driven by reductions in suicide
in the high-facility states, which arrive in the year after PDMP implementation. This is consistent
with the mechanisms in the model, and specifically, an inherent risk of suicide associated with
drug addition. These estimates suggest that treatment availability interacted with a supply shock
may boost drug addicts’ incentives to recover and cause suicides to decline, which is in line with
the predictions of the model.31
We have argued that PDMPs should reduce the supply of prescriptions to drug addicts but ac-
knowledge that the specifics of PDMPs may differ between states, particularly the circumstances in
which the database is accessed and the set of drugs that are covered by the program. Buchmueller
and Carey (2018) present evidence suggesting that stricter programs—i.e., PDMPs where pre-
scribers are mandated to access the database before prescribing—have a greater effect on measures
of drug misuse than weaker programs. We leverage these differences to further test the implica-
tions of our model. Columns 3 and 6 (Table 2.2) restrict attention to “must-access” PDMPs.32 The
estimates suggest that an additional standard deviation in treatment centers is associated with a 9.9
to 12.4 percent decrease in suicides after the passage of these stricter PDMPs, which is larger than
the effects in columns 2 and 5. These results leverage fewer reforms, and have correspondingly
larger standard errors. In spite of this, these larger point estimates are in line with the prediction of
the model that the addicts’ incentives to recover are increasing in the size of the supply shock.
To measure differences in stringency across PDMPs, we also use a PDMP score constructed by
the Trust for America’s Health and The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, who assessed 10 dif-
ferent policies that states have implemented in their PDMPs to combat prescription drug abuse.33
29Figure B.2 in the Appendix B presents evidence suggesting that PDMPs did not impact the number of treatment
facilities, and PDMPs were not passed in places that were experiencing an increase in the number of treatment facili-
ties. This evidence further suggests that variation in treatment centers independent of the timing of PDMPs identifies
our coefficients of interest.
30These results have the same order of magnitude than the results in Swensen (2015).
31In Table B.2 we present estimates using the logarithm of the number of facilities as opposed to the number of
facilities (in standard deviations). The negative coefficients on the interaction term remain unchanged.
32See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for details on states with must-access PDMPs.
33For more information, please refer to Levy, Segal and Miller (2013).
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The score takes values between 0 and 10, where greater values capture PDMPs with a stronger set
of policies to combat abuse. In Table B.3, we replace the PDMP dummy for the PDMP score in
our usual specifications. We find that a stronger PDMP magnifies the interaction effect between
treatment availability and PDMPs in reducing suicides. That is, for a given level of treatment avail-
ability, a stronger PDMP has a greater effect on suicides, as the model would predict. Importantly,
we find no correlation between the stringency of the PDMP and the availability of drug treatment
services (either facilities or use of medication-assisted therapy) in the state.
In Table 2.3, we present state–quarter level estimates for the mean effect of PDMPs on suicides
and the heterogeneous effects by drug treatment and opioid availability. We report the linear and
Poisson regression estimates in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.34 In Column 1 (Panel A), PDMP
legislation has no overall effect on suicides. Columns 2 through 4 (Panel A) report heterogeneity
in the effect of PDMPs based on measures of the availability and effectiveness of treatment. The
estimated coefficients suggest that the introduction of a PDMP in a state with 1% more drug ad-
diction treatment facilities is estimated to cause a 0.02 percent decrease in suicides. The use of
opioid-replacement therapy like methadone and buprenorphine have a negative effect on suicides,
meaning that a state with 1% greater availability of methadone/buprenorphine is estimated to ex-
perience a decrease in suicides of 0.027 and 0.029 percent, respectively. Panel B shows Poisson
regression estimates that are in line with those in Panel A. Although the effects are modest in the
aggregate, the effect of PDMPs on dispensed drugs is similarly modest.35
In summary, the evidence in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide support for the mechanism that we
highlight in the model, where the supply shock incentivizes drug addicts to seek recovery and thus
reduces suicide. This mechanism explains why the overall impact of PDMPs on suicides is only
found to be negative in states with above average availability of treatment, which as argued above,
are the states where exerting costly effort towards recovery is more productive. These results also
provide support for the existence of the inherent risk of abusing drugs (Kuramoto et al. 2012, Ilgen
et al. 2016, Fischer et al. 2005) because the effort of recovery channel can only explain a decline in
suicides if using drugs is inherently risky.36 The existence of an inherent risk of suicide associated
34In Table B.4 we replicate Table 2.3 using the level of facilities instead of the logarithm of facilities. The results
are qualitatively identical.
35The estimates of Buchmueller and Carey (2018) imply that the strongest PDMPs reduce the supply of diverted
drug by 8-15%, at the most. If we assume that PDMPs reduce the supply of diverted drugs by 10%, and that 20%
of suicides are drug-related (nearly the entire increase since 2000), then we would arrive at an elasticity of 1 for the
response of suicide to treatment following a reduction in the supply of diverted drugs.
36Our theoretical analysis does not model the process of becoming an addict. One might think that the decline in
suicides in some states may be in part due to a more limited number of new addicts caused by the supply shock. Even
if this is the case, however, the decline in suicides would still be explained by having fewer people exposed to the
inherent risk of drug abuse.
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with prescription drug abuse implies that the rise in suicides documented by Case and Deaton
(2015a) and others can be attributed, at least in part, to the rise in prescription drug use.
Several interesting heterogeneity analyses appear in the Appendix B. Women have been partic-
ularly affected by the rise in opiate abuse and suicide, and in Table B.5 we separate the sample by
gender and repeat our county–year Poisson regression analysis. The coefficients for women are
consistently larger than those for men, both for the effect of treatment availability on its own, and
when interacted with PDMPs. These results imply that the availability of treatment is particularly
important for women. In Table B.6 we repeat our county–year analysis including individuals of all
races and all ages. The table shows that the effects are found in the larger population, though they
are weaker, likely due to the low suicide rates in other demographic groups. Finally, in Table B.8,
we separate counties by large urban, medium/small urban, and rural, and repeat our county–year
analysis. Table B.8 suggests that the effect of PDMPs on suicides are greatest in large urban and
rural areas.
Finally, it is important to note two limitations in the analysis. First, we cannot directly mea-
sure the size of the supply-shock to the market for diverted drugs caused by the introduction of a
PDMP. Evidence from Buchmueller and Carey (2018) suggests the “first-stage” effect is modest, in
the range of a 10-15 percent reduction in sales to the heaviest users, implying that the local average
treatment effects may be large. Second, we do not exploit a quasi-experimental source of exoge-
nous variation in drug treatment center concentrations and the availability of medication-assisted
therapies. As a result, these variables serve as proxies for the availability and efficacy of treatment
within the state or county, and may themselves be correlated with one another and other measures
of treatment network efficacy. For these two reasons, we interpret the evidence as supportive of
the model’s mechanism and consistent with an important role for access to drug treatment and
opioid-replacement therapy in reducing suicides associated with prescription drug abuse.
2.4.3 Robustness
We present a range of robustness checks in the Appendix B. We test for pre-trends using an event
study design in Appendix Figures B.1 and 2.3. The individual estimates are noisy, however, we
find no statistically significant evidence for pre-trends, and the point estimates are inconsistent
with a gradual roll out of demand-side interventions that are timed with the PDMPs.
We also consider robustness to alternative specifications and measurement issues. We allow the
county-level model to drop counties with zero suicides in the period. In Appendix Tables B.14 and
B.15, we show the results are very similar when we instead focus on counties with suicides in every
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period, or replace the zeros in the data with ones. In our analysis, we have restricted the sample
to states that have implemented PDMPs after 2003. In Table B.9, we repeat our analysis using all
the states, and we find that the estimates remain qualitatively identical. We also find similar results
when replicating Table 2.2 with time-varying demographic and economic condition controls at the
county–year level (see Tables B.10 to B.12).
Lastly, we also note that our dependent variable—the number of suicides—differs from our ideal
dependent variable—the number of suicides motivated by addiction problems. Our data separate
suicides between drug overdoses and suicides by means other than drugs, however, this does not
necessarily help us build a measure closer to our ideal dependent variable—in the sense that not
all overdoses are by addicts and not all addicts commit suicide by overdosing (and likewise for
suicides by means other than drugs). While we prefer using the overall number of suicides as
our dependent variable, this suicide breakdown provides us with alternative measures to test our
hypotheses. In Table B.13, we repeat our analysis using suicides by means other than drugs and
find that the results are qualitatively similar (though noisier in the former case).37
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The prescription drug epidemic and the concurrent increase in suicides among middle-aged non-
Hispanic whites in the US have raised questions about the forces driving these trends. In this paper,
we investigate the link between supply shocks to the market for diverted drugs, identified by the
implementation of PDMPs, and suicides. We find only minimal evidence that the introduction of
PDMPs affected suicide rates. However, we do find important heterogeneity in the response to
PDMPs: states with strong addiction help networks, measured by the number of drug treatment
facilities and likelihood of prescribing medication-assisted therapy, saw relative declines in suicide
rates after the implementation of PDMPs. Most surprisingly, the heterogeneity seems to be driven
by absolute decreases in suicide in states with strong addiction help networks.
Our primary analysis makes use of PDMPs as a generic supply shock, however, the magnitude
of the estimated effects has implications for aggregate mortality. To quantify the role of drug
treatment on suicide prevention, we calculate the counterfactual number of suicides if all states
would have had the same logged number of facilities as California (or Washington) when passing
their PDMPs. We estimate that this expansion in drug treatment availability would have reduced
the expected number of suicides by 18,232.38 That is a 4.7 percent decrease in the expected number
37See Patrick et al. (2016) for a discussion on PDMPs and drug overdose deaths.
38For this exercise, we make use of the estimates in Table 2.3 (Column 2).
58
of suicides over the course of our sample period. The modest effects of PDMPs on dispensed drugs
estimated in other studies suggests that larger supply changes could explain an important share of
the rise in suicide in places with weak addiction-help networks.
Our results have immediate implications for the current response of policy to the prescription
drug epidemic and concurrent rise in suicides. Although these programs have reduced access
to prescription opioids, unintended consequences could neutralize the expected positive effect.
Put simply, addicts need a path out of addiction. Our findings suggest that attempts to reduce
the supply of diverted drugs should be accompanied with expansions of drug treatment options,
as the combination of reductions in the supply of prescription drugs in conjunction with readily
available drug treatment can reduce suicide rates. As well, our results suggest that opiate-assisted
therapies are effective in reducing suicide rates of those in drug treatment. We believe these are the
first quasi-experimental results demonstrating the role of drug treatment and medication-assisted
therapies in mitigating drug-abuse related suicides.
Our study also makes a contribution to the economic analysis of suicide. We propose a new
model of suicide, which incorporates the inherent risks of drug abuse. The model allows us to
rationalize several elements of our findings. First, explicitly modeling the effort of addicts to
quit using provides a force that can decreases suicides in the aftermath of a supply shock. The
economics behind this effect is that using becomes less attractive relative to recovery when addicts
find it costlier to access the drug, which increases the addicts’ incentives to exert effort and recover.
However, increased incentives to exert effort only arise where effort is productive, that is, where
drug addiction treatment is available. Our findings—i.e., a reduction in suicides in places with drug
addiction treatment availability—present evidence in favor of both the existence of the inherent risk
of drug abuse and the mechanism proposed by our model.
As compared to classical economic models of suicide, an inherent risk suggests a role for in-
stantaneous utility, or a heavily discounted lifetime utility function. We know of one other paper,
Carpenter (2004), which finds an apparent role for substance use and instantaneous utility in sui-
cide rates. It is perhaps unsurprising that this evidence of an inherent risk comes from a setting
with addiction, given the importance of addictive behavior in motivating the behavioral economics
literature.
We conclude by noting the broader implications of our findings for the debate on the underly-
ing causes of the recent increase in both prescription drug abuse and suicide among white non-
Hispanics. While a narrative in the media and academic discourse has tied these troubling patterns
in mortality to trends in inequality, income growth, divorce, the decline in manufacturing em-
ployment and intergenerational mobility, a separate literature has identified dramatic changes in
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prescribing behavior as a fundamental cause of the rise in prescription drug abuse and overdose
deaths. However, prior to this paper, the literature has been largely silent on the underlying causes
of rising suicide. Our findings suggest a full accounting of the effects of prescription drug use and
abuse on suicide is needed, along with investigations into deeper social trends that may explain the
apparent misery of so many Americans.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Suicides by Race and Age Group
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Between 45-54  Above 55 years old
Note: Trends are computed from (NVSS) Multiple Causes of Death Microdata (1999-2014), and correspond to all
deaths of individuals over 30 years old, including states without a PDMP implemented after 1999.
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(b) Counties With High Level of Facilities
Note: The figure shows coefficients and associated clustered standard errors from an event study in which log number
of suicides is the dependent variable, and the year of PDMP implementation is the baseline year (t = 0). The coun-
ties were divided by their standardized level of facilities. Counties with facilities above 0.8 standard deviations are
classified as High. This regression is run at the county–year level, and includes county FE and year FE.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
A. Cause of death for White non-Hispanic over 30 years old
Unit: count deaths (county–year)
Suicides 9.82 21.84 0 4 499
Opioid–related overdosea 2.19 7.18 0 0 142
Overdose 8.62 23.09 0 2 469
Unit: count deaths (state–quarter)
Suicides 113.41 116.51 0 83 734
Opioid–related overdosea 25.11 35.53 0 13 238
Overdose 98.72 119.02 0 61 734
B. Distribution of opiates and opiod-replacement therapy (state–quarter)
Unit: Morphine Equivalent Milligrams (MME) per person and Milligrams per person (MP)
Total opiatesb(MME) 182.81 93.22 37.25 172.48 773.31
Oxycodone (MME) 135.01 76.70 23.40 123.44 700.04
Methadone (MP) 21.60 18.70 0.62 16.11 122.88
Buprenorphine (MP) 2.39 2.45 0 1.61 12.0
C. Treatment related variables
Unit: count centers (county–year)
Facilities 5.95 17.58 0 5.09 563
Unit: count centers (state–quarter)
Facilities 251.45 278.33 33 201.50 1820
Note: The table reports unweighted summary statistics for key variables in the 38 states included in our sample. Panel
A displays the number of deaths by two underlying causes of death: suicide and overdose. The information was
obtained from NVSS. Data spans years 1999 to 2014. Panel B presents the MME and MP for opiates and opiod-
replacement substances. The data source is the DEA and the information is at the state–quarter level for the period
2000-2013. Panel C displays on the number of facilities, and this information comes from County of Business Pattern
and N-SSATS.
a Drug poisoning deaths include injury deaths of any intent (unintentional, suicide, homicide, or undetermined) in
which an opioid drug was mentioned.
b Morphine equivalent sum of oxycodone, fentanyl, hydromorphone, meperidine, and morphine.
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Table 2.2: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.040) (0.002) (0.025)
Mean 50.21 50.21 50.21 49.23 49.23 49.23
Unweighted mean 10.85 10.85 10.85 9.34 9.34 9.34
Observations 22477 22477 22477 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1714 1714 1714 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions
include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Effects of PDMPs by State-Level Treatment Availability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: log suicides. OLS regressions.
PDMP -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.003







Panel B. Dependent variable: suicide count. Poisson regressions.
PDMP -0.022∗∗∗ -0.005 0.005 -0.000







Mean 206.31 210.50 213.71 218.49
Unweighted mean 107.73 111.43 113.77 115.06
Observations 2430 1698 1356 1254
States 38 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from two types of models. Panel A corresponds to OLS models where the dependent variable is the
logarithm of suicides in a state× quarter. Panel B shows the results for Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of suicides
in a state× quarter. The independent variables are in logs, and all the regressions control for state FE and quarter FE. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered by state. The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each state. The
weighted mean (‘Mean’) and unweighted mean were computed in the pre-period.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
The Response of Physicians to Expansions in Public
Health Insurance
How do physicians respond to an increase in the number of public insured people? The answer to
this question is crucial for estimating the social benefits of expanding public coverage, especially
for the reason that policy will be effective as long as its health care providers are available to
beneficiaries. Access to medical care, and to providers, in particular, remains an unsolved issue for
Medicaid beneficiaries the program’s creation in 1965. The General Accountability Office (2011)
conducted a survey to assess the problem of access for children, finding that 83% of primary care
physicians participate in the program. Regardless, access problems are present in the form of
longer waiting lists for Medicaid patients, increased difficulty in referring children to specialists,
and lower acceptance of new Medicaid patients versus private ones (Group 1994, Wang et al. 2004,
Hwang et al. 2005, Office 2011 and Rosenbaum 2011).
This study examines the response of pediatricians to the implementation of the Children Health
Insurance Program (CHIP), an adjunct Medicaid program implemented in 1997. The discussion
is organized around the changes in labor supply, the participation of pediatricians in Medicaid and
the mobility of physicians across different types of practice. The regression model corresponds to a
reduced-form specification where the policy variable is the variation in CHIP generosity, measured
as the increase in the percentage of children eligible for Medicaid. In accordance with previ-
ous studies, I find that states with higher expansion rates experienced a greater decrease in the
physician labor supply and also a larger, but modest, increase in the percentage of revenues from
Medicaid and pediatrician participation in the program. These results provide suggestive evidence
of a crowding-out of private insurance after CHIP’s implementation.
Further, the current study supplements existing literature by estimating the effect of CHIP as it
relates to the allocation of physicians across practice of different sizes. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this analysis has not been conducted for CHIP, and is an area of particular relevance as
concentration of health workforce at large institutions might increase health insurance premiums.
Results on market structure are also consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, showing that
physicians, who moved the most from small to large practices, are in fact those who also expected
to be disproportionately affected by the crowding-out of private insurance. Further, results suggest
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that a 10 Percentage Point (pp) higher expansion rate of CHIP translates as a decrease of 2.3 pp
in the probability of working in solo practices. At the same, this higher expansion produces an
increase of 1.6 pp in the probability of working at a hospital. These estimates are computed with
the panel sample, thus they rule out compositional effects.
Empirical evidence on the effect of Medicaid expansions on the physician labor supply suggests
that doctors increase their participation in the program (Baker and Royalty 2000, Buchmueller,
Miller and Vujicic 2014 and Garthwaite 2012), despite the low fee that Medicaid pays to doctors.
This finding is supported by demand studies that show an increase in the utilization of Medicaid
medical services (Aizer 2007, Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004, Currie and Gruber 1996 and Miller
2012) after an expansion. This observation could be explained by the fact that doctors might adjust
according to various margins (other than price). For example, if capacity constraints are not bind-
ing, physicians can increase their hours worked or hire more members to serve on a complementary
workforce, such as nurse practitioners (Buchmueller, Miller and Vujicic (2014)). The current study
is based on the research done by Garthwaite (2012), who find that after CHIP, physicians decreased
their hours worked but increased their participation in the program. The author used the predic-
tions of a two-market model in Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell (1978) to interpret this finding as
evidence of crowding-out from the implementation of CHIP. Moreover, the researcher presented
evidence that shorter office visits may have been the mechanism driving these results.
As noted, the research on the current study differs from previous ones by analyzing the con-
centration of doctors in fewer and larger practices. If many privately insured individuals switch to
the the public program, then the expected average price per visit would decrease, and physicians
may be forced to close their practice and join or merge with a larger one. Studying the changes in
market structure is important as this may explain the raise in health insurance premiums observed
since the mid 1990’s.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describe the two largest Medicaid expansion before
the Affordable Care Act, and presents evidence on crowding-out. Section 3.2 explains the theoret-
ical framework use to derive the expected sign for the variables of interest. Section 3.3 describes
the pre-period conditions of states and physicians included in the study. Section 3.4 provides the
empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents the results, and in section 3.6 I conclude.
3.1 Medicaid and the Children Health Insurance Program
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides health insurance to low-income individuals.
Before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) the target population of the program
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were children, disabled persons, and pregnant women. According to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), between 1995 and 2010, children represented at least 50% of the total
enrollees 1. In fact, two larger nationwide expansions before the ACA, were mainly directed to
decrease the number of uninsured children.
Medicaid programs are controlled at the state level, and differ widely in their criteria eligibility,
type of benefits, and payment system. The main criterion to determine eligibility is family income
level, which must fall below a certain threshold with respect to the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). As
for benefits, some states offer vision and dental coverage while others do not. Also, some states
required copayments from beneficiaries at the top part of the income distribution.
Most importantly, providers are paid under different systems. Depending on the state of practice,
doctors are reimbursed under a full capitation, partial capitation and/or fee-for-service system.
With full capitation, states pay a fixed amount per patient per year. This means that if doctors
provide fewer services than expected they keep the difference between the cost and the Medicaid
payment, but if the patient required extra care the doctor would have to cover the cost. In contrast,
a fee for service system pays per service.
A survey conducted by Braid, Manard and Carney (1995) to Medicaid agencies showed that
by June 1994 nearly all states had some sort of Medicaid managed care program (fully or partial
capitation); however, almost 93% of Medicaid payments were made as fee-for-service (FFS). This
latter aspect is crucial for the theoretical model explained below because the model assumes that
physicians are paid a fixed amount per service. Therefore, the evidence on Braid, Manard and
Carney (1995) validates this assumption.
As indicated, Medicaid legislation providse a rich source of variation to study the impacts of
two major nationwide Medicaid expansions. The first one took place over the 1987-1992 when
the federal government allowed states to offer coverage to children from all family structures,
not only single parent families. Additionally, extended income limits up to 133 percent of the
Federal Poverty Line (FPL) for children up to six years old, and 100 percent for children born after
September 1983.
The second one took place in September of 1997, when the President Clinton’s administration
implemented the Children Health Insurance Program (CHIP), that “...authorized states to expand
coverage to children in families with income up to the higher of 200 percent of FPL or 50 per-
centage points above the Medicaid eligibility level in effect on March 31, 1997” (Rosenbach et al.,
2001, p.6). As typical for Medicaid practices, states had discretion to modify income criterion,
and deide whether to increase the size of their existing Medicaid program (M-CHIP), or create a
1CMS reports do not decompose the ”Disable” category between children and adults.
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separate one (S-CHIP). The Figure 3.1 shows the change in the states’ mean threshold.
The program increased the number of children ever enrolled2 by 36.4 percent between 1998 and
2005. Notably, S-CHIP was the preferred option, with 35 states opting for it (Figure C.1).
Although these two expansions substantially increased the number of Medicaid eligible children,
the number of uninsured children decreased at a slow rate. Opponents to Medicaid expansions
argue that these policies encourage private insured individuals to switch to the public program
and increasing public burden. However, it could also be the case that there is a low adoption of
the newly available Medicaid coverage. The next section discusses evidence about crowding out
produced by these two expansions.
3.1.1 Crowding out of Private Health Insurance
A pitfall of expanding public health insurance coverage is that individuals that would otherwise
have private insurance might now apply for public assistance. Crowding out increases the burden
for the public sector without reducing the number of uninsured people, making the policy inef-
fective. The Figure 3.2 indicates, by type of insurance, the distribution of adults and children in
families below 400 percent of the FPL. As mentioned, before the ACA, children below this income
threshold were the main target of Medicaid.
Panel A and B show a different dynamic between adults and children. Indeed the substitution
pattern for children is clear. Panel B illustrates that during the first expansion (1987–1992), the
percentage of children with private insurance decreased from 67 percent to 63 percent, while the
public insured increased 5 pp and the uninsured remain stable. As for CHIP expansion, there is a
clear trend only after 2004 when the percentage of public insured individuals raised from 37 to 48
percent, and the privately insured individuals decreased in 10 pp.
It is important to note that the figure might also reflect changes in the business cycle, rises in
premiums, and general variations in private insurance contracts (e.g. deductibles). In fact, during
the first years of CHIP’ implementation, the US was experiencing its longest economic boom
(1995–2001), which may have mitigated the crowding-out effect of CHIP. However, what is clear
from the figure is that after CHIP’s implementation there was a structural decrease in the percentage
of uninsured children, a feature that is not visible for adults.
To address the endogeneity problem, a variety of methods were employed to measure the magni-
tude of the crowding-out effect. The results, however, are ambiguous. Some studies found minimal
or no evidence of crowding-out (Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004 and Ham and Shore-Sheppard
2Number of children enrolled in the programs at least one month during the year.
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2005), while other studies obtained crowding-out rates from CHIP of 50% and 60% (LoSasso and
Buchmueller 2004 and Gruber and Simon 2008). The most recent studies compute heterogeneous
crowding-out effects across observable demographic characteristics and states. Ham, Ozbeklik and
Shore-Sheppard (2010) found that crowding-out is smaller in groups of children with high levels of
private coverage in the pre-CHIP period. On the other hand, Muhlestein and Seiber (2013) found
different crowding-out levels throughout different states, with effects varying between 0 and 18%.
The authors also estimated that children in high expansion states are less likely to be crowded–out.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework used in this study is a simplification of the model proposed by Sloan,
Mitchell and Cromwell (1978), which is the common reference in the literature. To start with,
assume that the representative physician operates in two markets, public and private, and has some
market power in the private one. The doctor accepts a fixed dollar payment for each unit of service
provided to Medicaid patient, which is assumed to be paid under a fee-for-service3 system. It is
assumed that the physician has a common cost function both markets. Therefore, the maximization
problem under this setting is:
Max
x,y
π = s∗ x+[ f (s̃;M)+ p(y;M)]y− c(x+ y,N) (3.1)
where s is the fixed payment from Medicaid; x is the units sold to Medicaid patients; f (.) is the
expected (mean) fee schedule for the price-setting market; s̃ is non-Medicaid insurer’s fee schedule;
M is any exogenous variable affecting the price-setting demand curve; p(.) is the inverse demand
function in the private market, and y is the number of units sold to private patients.
The first order conditions are:
0 = (s)−C1(.) (3.2)
0 = f (.)+ p(.)+ yp1(.)− g̃−C1(.) (3.3)
0 = ( f2(.)+ p2(.)−1)y (3.4)
3System where services are paid separately, so health care providers are paid for each office visit, each test, or
procedure.It is well known that this payment gives an incentive to over treat because doctors are paid with respect to
the quantity instead of quality of care.
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then the physician participates in both markets if:
s = f (.)+ p(.)+ yp1(.). (3.5)
and he does not participates in Medicaid if:
(s−g)<C1(.) = f (.)+ p(.)+ yp1(.) (3.6)
The equation Equation 3.6 reflects the fact that not all physicians participate in Medicaid, so
there must be doctors with marginal costs greater than s. Figures fig:Mono and 3.4 compares
the response of physicians, conditional on level of demand, e.g. physicians in the same zip code
zone. According to the model, an expansion always increases the quantity of services provided
to Medicaid patients; however, its impact on physician’s participation and income depends on the
composition of the new insured patients. There are two extreme scenarios. In the first one all the
new insured switched from private insurance to public insurance (Figure 3.3). This translates into
a shift to the left of the private demand curve shift. In the second scenario, all the new insured
where previously uninsured.
Figure 3.4 that there are three types of patients: the high type are privately insured patients that
can pay above Medicaid fee (segment AB in Figure 3.3), and for who the physician can charge the
monopoly price. The second type are the Medicaid patients, represented with the flat line. Since
Medicaid set the price for visits, then the demand is completely elastic and the total demand for
medical services is equal to E−E0. The segment DF are the fraction of individuals that can not
pay above s, and are possibly the uninsured ones. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, given a level of
demand, the quantity supplied by physicians will depend on the location of their supply curve.
A doctor with a curve like MC1 only takes privately insured patients (Q01); a doctor with MC2
participates in both markets and supply in total Q02 services, and a physician with large relative
capacity like MC3 take all three type of patients. It is worth noting that there is no mechanism to
ensure that the quantity supplied equals the the quantity demanded E−E0. Therefore, is expected
that Medicaid patients face restrictions to access physician services.
An expansion with perfect crowd-out shift to the left the private demand curve AB (Figure 3.3)
in an amount equal to the red segment E −E1. All physicians, regardless of their supply curve
location, will increase the units sold to Medicaid patients and their income will decrease. This
result follows from the substitution of high-pay with low-pay patients. For example, a physician
like MC1 that was initially supplying Q01 units at a price p , will only supply Q
1
1 unit at s−g after




3), but now they will have to reset their quantities between the private and the public
market. Since the government program pays at a lower price, their income will decrease.
Figure 3.4 shows the case where all new Medicaid patients were previously uninsured. The
amount of the expansion will be exactly the same (red segment E1−E0), but without crowd-out the
increase will only affect providers with supply curves like MC3. These doctors will experience an
increase in their income because they can substitute lower-payer private patients (DF) for Medicaid
beneficiaries. In contrast, physicians with supply curves like MC1 and MC2, should not change
their participation in the government program and their income should stay constant.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The database used for this study is the restricted version of the Community Tracking Study Physi-
cian Survey (CTPS), for the periods 1996-1997, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 . This is a self-report
survey that provides information at the physician level for 60 communities, wherein 48 are large
metropolitan areas4. To allow for national estimates the survey was supplemented with responses
from physicians at random national locations. The original survey does not contain information
for Alaska and Hawaii, and I restricted the sample to those states that have data for pediatricians5;
therefore, this study includes 44 of the 51 states.
The key independent variable in this study is the generosity of Medicaid programs, which could
be measured by the percentage of children eligible for Medicaid. A problem with this variable, is
that it also reflects differences in states’ demographic characteristics and/or local economic condi-
tions. To isolate the effect of the program from other factors related with demand for insurance, I
follow Garthwaite (2012) who used Cutler and Gruber (1996) simulated instrument methodology.
The instrument is constructed by taking a fixed national sample of children from the CPS, and
imputing the eligibility rules by state, year and age. The national sample is formed by resampling
at each age category, and the final simulated rate (simelig) is computed as the average eligibility
rate obtained in 1000 repetitions of the procedure.
4Boston, Cleveland, Greenville, Indianapolis, Lansing, Little Rock, Miami, Newark, Orange County, Phoenix,
Seattle, Syracuse, Atlanta, Augusta, Baltimore, Bridgeport, Chicago, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Greensboro, Hous-
ton, Huntington, Killeen, Knoxville, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Middlesex, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Modesto, Nassau,
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland, Riverside, Rochester, San Antonio, San Francisco, Santa Rosa, Shreve-
port, St. Louis, Tampa, Tulsa, Washington, West Palm Beach, Worcester, Dothan, Terre, Wilmington, West Central
Alabama, Central Arkansas , Northern Georgia , Northeastern Illinois , Northeastern Indiana , Eastern Maine , Eastern
North Carolina, Northern Utah and Northwestern Washington. The first 12 sites were randomly selected to be studied
in depth through larger sample sizes.
5New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming do not report pediatricians’ information.
73
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the eligibility and the simulated rates, for each of
the survey periods and the 44 states. Panel A shows that the average eligibility rate increased after
CHIP’s implementation in 1997. The rate fell in 2000-2001, but continued to be higher (36%)
than the pre-period level (26%). This might be explained by the economic expansion of the end
of 1990’s. The minimum, median and maximum also increased, showing that CHIP affected all
parts of the distribution. Panel B shows a similar trend for the instrument (simelig), but in contrast
with the eligibility rate, the minimum of simelig didn’t change. This is due to Arkansas, where the
minimum expansion level was implemented (100% FPL for children older than 16 years) and the
pre-periods limits were restrictive. The coefficient of correlation between the two measures is 0.63
in each of the three survey periods.
The analysis that follows will grouped states according to the magnitude of their expansion,
defined as the difference of simelig after and before CHIP . This distinction is useful because
the empirical strategy makes use of changes in simelig, to estimate the effect of the program on
physicians’ labor supply and income. Statistics are given for all the states, and also individually
for states with very low, low, high and very high expansions. The later classification was made
using the standard deviation with respect to the mean expansion (16%).
Table 3.2 presents demographic and economic characteristics of states in the pre-period (1995-
1996). As can be seen, states that implemented higher expansions had less generous Medicaid
programs in 1995-1996 period, with simulated eligibility rates around 26% versus 30% rate of the
lower expansion states. This is consistent with the distribution of children among type of insurance.
Panel B shows that states with higher expansions had in the pre-period more uninsured children and
less private insured ones. Private health insurance in the US is given primarily through employers,
which explains the link between this type of insurance and unemployment rates (Panel C). Panel
D, shows that states were similar in terms of the percentage of children in the population, but varies
widely in the percentage of black and hispanic children even within the expansion categories.
Before moving to the physicians’ descriptive statistics, is important to note that states in the
sample differ in their initial eligibility, but in general they expanded their Medicaid programs
following the federal mandate, and not beyond it. Therefore, the exogeneity assumption about
states’ legislation appears to be valid. As regard to the characteristics of physicians in higher versus
lower expansion states, the Table 3.3 presents the average of the outcomes of interest, variables
related to access to care of Medicaid patients, and physician demographic characteristics.
In average pediatricians in low expansion states reported lower income, slightly lower hours
worked in patient care and medical activities. This last category includes activities like teaching
and time spend in administrative duties. As for the variables related to Medicaid, the table shows
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that in average pediatricians’ practices received 20% of their revenue from Medicaid, except for
physicians in High expansion states that received 25%.
The survey also asked if the practice is accepting none, some, most or all new Medicaid and
private insured patients. Even though, this is a rough estimation of access, it could gives insights
about supply restrictions. I constructed four set of variables from this question, in order to measure
possible supply restrictions. The first set of variables constructed from the question, measure
the percentage of pediatricians that were accepting any new patient. In Panel B these variables are
preceded by “Extensive: acceptance of ”. As can be seen, only 75% of pediatricians in the category
“ Very High”, were accepting new Medicaid patients, compare to 87% in other states. On the other
hand, as it was expected, more pediatricians accepted new private insured patients than Medicaid.
The second set is denoted by “Intensive: acceptance of ”, and correspond to variables that take
values from one to four, where one is accepting none new patient and four is accepting all of
them. In general, pediatricians in low expansion states had higher pre-period acceptance rates for
Medicaid (3.2 vs 2.7), and private patients (3.6 vs 3.4).
The fourth set corresponds to “Restriction of Medicaid patients”, a variable that measures the
relative acceptance of Medicaid patients with respect to private one. This variable takes the value
of one when pediatricians are accepting more private patients than Medicaid ones. As can be seen,
53% of doctors in “Very High” expansion states restrict access to Medicaid, while only 34% and
21% did it in “Very Low” and “Low” states.
The last panel in Table 3.3 shows that a larger proportion of pediatricians in high expansion states
are female and had more years of practicing medicine. Other demographic variables, like race, are
not included because there are not available for all the survey periods. In conclusion, from the
analysis of pediatricians in the pre-period, is evident that high expansion states had doctors with
lower income and hours worked, and that they performed relatively worse in terms of access to
medical services to Medicaid patients.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows that, after CHIP implementation, pediatricians in low expansion states
moved in larger proportion to hospitals, compare to their peers in high expansion states. Addi-
tionally, for these later group the proportion of pediatricians working in solo practices6 (29%) was
higher than for the low expansion states (16%). This might explained the higher income earned
by physicians in the high categories, which also had more years of experienced. These results are
consistent if we can argue that physicians working by themselves required a stable demand for
their services in order to continue in the market.
The last results could be caused by changes in the surveyed pool of physicians, because towards
6Practices of 1 or 2 physicians
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the end of the sample period, more female and less experienced doctors were added to the survey.
To address this concern, I use only pediatrician in the panel sample, and compute the transition
matrices across practice size. The matrices show if pediatricians stay in the same type of practice
or if they move to another, between 1996 and 2000. The type of practices correspond to physicians
working by themselves, working in group practice of 2 doctors, 3 doctors, 4-7 doctors, more than
7, or in hospitals and medical schools. Panel A in Table 3.4, shows that 7.9% of pediatricians
working by themselves in 1996 keep working like this in 2000; while 0.9% moved from practicing
by themselves to a group practice of 2 doctors.
Similar to the results obtained in the cross-section sample, the panel sample also shows that pe-
diatricians in low states moved to hospitals in greater proportion than their peers in high expansion
states. It’s worth mentioning that states with low expansions had more generous programs before
CHIP, meaning, a larger percentage of their children where eligible for Medicaid. Therefore, the
previous findings suggest that the generous the Medicaid program is in absolute terms, the larger
is the probability of doctors to migrate from small to large practices like hospitals.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The previous section showed that, in comparison with high expansion states, low states had fewer
uninsured children and their programs were more generous before CHIP. Likewise, pediatricians in
these states earned less income, worked fewer hours and were associated in greater extend to group
practices and hospitals. This section use the variation in expansion rates to study the response of
physicians to CHIP. This is a reduced-form exercise, that relies on the identification assumption
that outcomes for doctors that were differentially affected by the new law would have evolved in
parallel.
To explore for state trends that might be correlated with the size of the expansion but not with
CHIP, I estimate the following model for three group of physicians: pediatricians, other primary
care physicians (internists and general/family practice) and specialists:
Yist = δs +φt +βt ∗φt ∗4Qs +X ′ist ∗αt + εist (3.7)
where i is physician in state s at time t. Yist is the outcome of interest, δs and φt are state and
time fixed effects, X ′ist denotes control variables at the physician level that includes gender and a
set of quartic in experience. The subscript on αt indicates that the effect of the control variables
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may differ across survey periods. The coefficients of interest are βt which correspond to the inter-
action term between the years after CHIP and the expansion rate (4Qs). In section 3.3 I defined
this rate as the difference between the value of simelig after CHIP and its value in 1996. The β
coefficients measure if states with higher expansion rates experienced a greater decrease/increase
in the outcome of interest from 1996 to 1998/2000. The effects on β are estimated relative to 1996,
the survey period previous to CHIP implementation.
Tables C.1 to C.6, show that in particular for the variables related with Medicaid (participation in
the program, revenues from Medicaid, and acceptance of new Medicaid patients), the three groups
of physicians exhibit a negative and statistically significant β. This finding is in part due to a
greater decrease in unemployment rates of high expansion states in the late 1990s. This translated
in larger percentage of individuals with private insurance. Ideally, I would control for these trends
by including a state-time-trend variable; however, since the policy variable (φt4Qs) varies at the
same level, the inclusion of a state-time-trend would cancel out the effect of the policy. Therefore,
I use physicians in other primary care (OPCP) specialties to account for these trends.
The new specification corresponds to :
Yist = δs +φt + β̃t ∗φt ∗4Qs ∗PEDist +µt ∗φt ∗4Qs +X ′ist ∗αt + εist (3.8)
where all the variables are as described above, and PEDist is a dummy for pediatricians. The
coefficients of interest are the β̃t , which correspond to triple difference estimators (DDD). To
see how this last specification takes care of the third difference, suppose you want to compute
the change in hours worked for pediatricians in Minnesota. Previously I showed that the βt in
Equation 3.7 are biased estimators, because they also capture variations in local conditions. To
control for this common state trend, you can use as a counterfactual the change in the outcome of
OPCP in the state, in this case Minnesota (MN). Therefore, β̃2000 is measuring:
β̃2000 = (E[Yist |2000, i = PED,4QMN ]−E[Yist |1996, i = PED,4QMN ])
−(E[Yist |2000, i = OPCP,4QMN ]−E[Yist |1996, i = OPCP,4QMN ])
(3.9)
After estimating this equation for the longitudinal sample, I estimate a physician fixed effect
model, to rule out compositional effects. It is important to bear in mind that physicians in the
longitudinal and panel sample are different across demographic characteristics. For example, pe-
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diatricians in the panel sample are older, have more years of experience and are in a larger extent
males (Table 3.6). This might matters for comparing estimates across the samples.
Finally, to investigate further for the presence of crowd-out I estimate a third specification, where
the treatment group is pediatricians who were accepting less new Medicaid patients with respect
to new privately insured ones in the pre-period (1996-1997). Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell (1978)
model predicts that, under crowding-out, physicians that were not taking Medicaid patients will
start doing so after the expansion (Figure 3.3). Since CTPS does not ask for number of patients in
each type of insurance, I identify with this measure the doctors with supply curve like MC1. Even
though, there exist alternative ways to identify this group, I select this measure to increase the
power of the test, given the smaller number of observations that I obtain in the alternative options.
The regression model is as follows:
Yist = θi +φt +λt ∗φt ∗4Qs ∗RESTist ∗PEDist +ρt ∗φt ∗4Qs ∗RESTi
+β̃t ∗φt ∗4Qs ∗PEDist +µt ∗φt ∗4Qs +X ′ist ∗αt + εist (3.10)
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Impact of Chip in Labor Supply and Income Variables
Table 3.7 shows the estimated coefficients of interest for the three specifications introduced pre-
viously in section 3.4. Panel A reports the results for the logarithm of income. As indicated,
there is no statistically significant change in the income of pediatricians in the longitudinal sample
(Column 2), or in the baseline panel specification (Column 4). However, Column 6 suggests that
pediatricians working in 1996 at practices that restrict access to new Medicaid patients ( here on
RESist), experienced a decrease in their income after CHIP. In particular a 10 percentage point (pp)
higher expansion rate translated into a decrease of 4,6% and 6,8% in the income of this group.
As for changes in the labor supply, Panel B indicates that there was a significant decrease in
the number of hours worked between 1996 and 2000 in high-expansion states, regardless of the
specification used. The point estimates in Columns 2 and 4 show that a 10 pp higher expansion rate
produce a decrease of 0.92 hours of time spend on patient care. Before CHIP’s implementation
pediatricians worked 40.7 hours on average, and if the mean CHIP expansion was 16%, this implies
that the program reduced 3.6% of hours worked by pediatricians.
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The interpretation of the coefficients in the following sections will be used as a reference for the
10 pp higher expansion rate.
3.5.2 Impact of Chip on the Access of Medicaid Patients to Health Care
Providers
Access of Medicaid patients to providers is approximated by the change in the physicians’ par-
ticipation in the program, revenues received from Medicaid, and the percentage of physicians
accepting new Medicaid patients. section 3.2 introduced the Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell (1978)
model, that predicts an increase -in these variables- after a Medicaid expansion. This prediction
holds regardless of the existence of crowding-out.
Column 2 in Table 3.8 indicates that the probability of participating in the program is greater
given a larger degree of expansion. The coefficient of 0.27 (std. error = 0.093) represents an
increase of 2.7 pp. This increment is moderate, given the initial participation rate of 88%. As for
the percentage of revenues from Medicaid, Panel B Column 2 shows that it increased in 5.4 pp and
5.2 pp. This represents a 24% increase over the pre-period ratio (22.6%). Notably, the fraction of
pediatricians taking new Medicaid patient augmented in 5.4 pp, or about 6.6% over the 1996 rate.
Columns 4 and 6 shows that the previous results do not hold once physician fixed effects are
considered. This might imply that the longitudinal results are less reliable, however, it should be
noted that pediatricians in the panel sample are relatively older and with more experience than
their peers in the longitudinal sample (Table 3.6. Moreover, the proportion of male pediatricians is
larger in the panel sample.
An interesting finding with specification 3 (Column 6) is a general effect of CHIP on the partici-
pation of physicians that were restricting access in 1996 (RESTist). Although the interaction terms
for pediatricians (rows 1 and 2) are not significant, the interaction between the expansion variable
and RESTist is positive and significant at the 10% level. This could be in part associated with
responses of other primary care physicians (OPCP) working in practices with pediatricians. How-
ever, it could also be the case that CHIP had a general equilibrium effect, causing crowding-out of
insurance in the adult market.
3.5.3 Impact of Chip in the Size of Practice
Table 3.9 presents the results for variations on type of practice. Changes in the market structure,
in particular, are observed. This study focuses on the question of whether or not after CHIP pedi-
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atricians in high-expansion states joined larger group practices or hospitals. Column 2 shows that
this is the case for the longitudinal sample, where the percentage of pediatricians in solo practices
decrease, while the percentage of physicians in group practices increases. The change for hospital
environments and the other categories are not statistically significant. The point estimates suggest
a decrease of 2.5% pp (std. error = 0.11) in the probability of working in solo practice, which
is about an 8.3% decrease with respect to the 1996 level (30%). The increase in group practice
probability compensates almost exactly for the later decrease.
To check if the result in the longitudinal sample is driven by changes in the composition of the
respondents, Column 4 presents the estimates for the panel sample. As can be shown, there is
no significant change in practice size variables; however, Column 6 shows that physicians in the
RESTist group moved from solo to hospital and larger group practices. This group corresponds in
the theoretical model to practices with relative capacity constraint, that would bear the cost of an
expansion with crowding-out of private insurance (Figure 3.3).
The results for the coefficients for 4Q ∗D00 ∗REST for solo practice and hospitals, suggest
that physicians disproportionately affected by crowding-out, experienced a greater increase in their
participation in hospitals, about 1.6 pp. In contrast, this group decreased their participation in solo
practices in 2.3% pp.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper uses as a quasi-experiment the implementation of the Children Health Insurance pro-
gram in 1997, to estimate the response of physicians to expansions in Medicaid eligibility. This
provides a rich source of variation as states increased eligibility in different magnitudes. In accor-
dance with previous studies on CHIP, I find evidence that the program decreased the hours worked
and increased moderately the doctors’ participation in the program. The results are consistent with
the presence of crowding-out. Additionally, the analysis on the market structure of physician prac-
tices, suggests that doctors who had relative capacity constraints, and thus were more likely to be
affected by the decrease in private insurance , moved in greater extent from small to large practices.
This results is important since concentration of physicians in large institutions might exacerbate
the increase in health premiums and therefore in health spending.
There are, however, limitations to the results obtained in this study. First, during the survey
period the US was experiencing one of its longest economic expansions; therefore, the response of
doctors might be very different under more mild economic conditions. In particular, it would be
interesting to estimate the effects after 2002, when there is a persistent increase in the percentage
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of public insured children. Second, the survey includes only physicians in metropolitan areas,
which can be corrected partially through the use of survey weights. Third, the survey does not
contain information on number of patients by type of insurance, which is one of the key variables
to measure access.
Finally, research on patient sorting has become more relevant as the recent ACA expansion
impose more pressure on the capacity of the health care system. Understanding how physicians
decide which patients to accept, is important as they will be deciding the allocation of care among
population. Recent evidence about patient screening is find in Alexander (2016) paper, who studies
a Medicare pilot program in New Jersey. The program paid doctors in hospitals a bonus if they re-
duced the cost of admitted patients. The author finds that physicians can identify low-cost patients,
which explains the sorting of healthier patients in participating hospitals, versus less healthier ones
in not participating hospitals. The extrapolation of these results to doctors’ visits is not straight-
forward, and thus it would be interesting to analyze how doctors select individuals among the pool
of Medicaid patients. In contrast with Alexander (2016) setting, where the doctors could perform
tests before admitting or not a patient in the hospital, in a doctors’ office visit is not clear that
physicians can gather information about the health of the patient, before the accepting decision.
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Note: The initial demanded quantity of services by Medicaid patients is E0−E. After the expansion
the quantity demanded by Medicaid beneficiaries will be E0−E1. Physicians with a supply curve in
the segment AB will be specially affected by the expansion, because under with crowd-out they will
have to provide services at a lower price.
Source: Baker and Royalty (2000)
.
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Note: An increase in coverage with no crowd-out and fix capacity should only change the decision of
physicians with marginal cost MC3.
Source: Scanlon (1980)
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Pediatricians by Practice Size and Medicaid Expansion





























Table 3.1: Eligibility Rate and Simulated Eligibility Rate
Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum
deviation
Panel A: Eligibility rate
1995-1996 0.26 0.08 0.14 0.24 0.47
1998-1999 0.41 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.60
2000-2001 0.36 0.09 0.22 0.34 0.53
Panel B: Simulated Eligibility rate
1995-1996 0.28 0.07 0.24 0.25 0.58
1998-1999 0.44 0.09 0.24 0.43 0.68
2000-2001 0.37 0.09 0.18 0.35 0.61
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of States Before CHIP Implementation (1995-1996)
All Very low Low High Very high
Expansion (change in simelig) 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.18 0.35
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Simulated eligibility 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.25
(0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01)
Panel A: Medicaid rules
Percentage of eligible children 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.24
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Panel B: Type of insurance
Uninsured 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Public 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.25
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Private 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.66
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13)
Panel C: Economic conditions
Unemployment 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel D: Demographic characteristics
Percentage of children 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Percentage of Black children 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.21 0.14
(0.15) (0.14) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05)
Percentage of Hispanic children 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.19
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.19)
Data are from BLS, CPS and SEER.
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of Pediatricians Before CHIP Implementation (1995-1996)
Variable Very low Low High Very high
Panel A: Outcomes of interest
Logarithm of income 11.61 11.54 11.63 11.64
(0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.02)
Hours worked in patient care 41.36 39.11 41.22 40.42
(3.19) (3.25) (2.53) (0.97)
Hours in medical activities 49.33 48.15 49.47 47.95
(3.16) (2.90) (3.02) (1.44)
Panel B: Access of Medicaid patients
Percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid 21.01 19.21 25.02 20.49
(3.96) (6.14) (7.85) (1.93)
Extensive:Acceptance of new Medicaid patients 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.75
(0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01)
Extensive: Acceptance of new private patients 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Intensive: Acceptance of new Medicaid patients 3.10 3.31 2.89 2.51
(0.59) (0.40) (0.24) (0.07)
Intensive: Acceptance of new private patients 3.62 3.53 3.42 3.43
(0.14) (0.11) (0.19) (0.05)
Restriction of Medicaid patients 0.34 0.21 0.37 0.53
(0.21) (0.19) (0.08) (0.02)
Panel C: Demographic characteristics
Female 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.47
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Years of experience 14.80 13.69 14.41 15.50
(1.38) (1.74) (1.55) (0.33)
Number of pediatricians 231 264 808 304
Cross-state standard deviations in parenthesis. Data is from CTPS.
87
Table 3.4: Transition Matrix for Pediatricians
(a) Low Expansion States
1996 / 2000 1 2 3 4-7 >7 Hospital Medical School
1 7.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
2 0.9 3.2 1.4 1.9 0.5 0.0 0.0
3 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.9 0.9 0.5 0.0
4-7 0.9 0.0 1.4 12.0 5.6 0.9 0.0
>7 1.9 0.9 1.9 2.8 22.2 3.7 0.9
Hospital 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.8 6.9 0.5
Medical School 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.9 6.9
Table 3.5: Transition Matrix for Pediatricians
(b) High Expansion States
1996 / 2000 1 2 3 4-7 >7 Hospital Medical School
1 18.0 2.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.0
2 1.2 3.9 2.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0
3 0.2 0.4 2.7 3.5 0.4 0.0 0.2
4-7 0.6 0.4 0.6 8.1 3.3 0.0 0.4
>7 1.2 1.2 1.0 4.1 19.0 2.5 1.2
Hospital 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.7 2.3 4.1 1.2
Medical School 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.6 4.1
Table 3.6: Characteristics of Pediatricians in Full and Panel Sample
Variable Full sample Panel sample p-values
Simulated eligibility rate 0.38 0.37 [0.32]
(0.11) (0.11)
Female 0.45 0.41 [0.0003]
(0.50) (0.49)
Experience 14.31 15.85 [0.0000]
(10.12) (9.44)
Age 46.16 47.57 [0.0000]
(10.24) (9.52)
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Table 3.7: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Pediatricians
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel Sample 1 Panel Sample 2
Panel A: Logarithm of income
4Q∗D98∗PED -0.153 -0.036 0.167
(0.126) (0.098) (0.151)










Panel B: Hours worked in patient care
4Q∗D98∗PED -4.426 -2.450 -3.445
(2.025) (3.060) (4.262)










Panel C: Hours worked in medical activities
4Q∗D98∗PED -15.085 -0.593 -2.457
(2.090) (2.581) (3.491)










N 21,526 8,499 8,499
n 2,833 2,833
Physician controls Y N N
State FE Y N N
Year FE Y Y Y
Physicians FE N Y Y
Clusters 44 41 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. Weights from CTPS are used in all specifications. The table reports the coefficients
βt of Equation 3.7, that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the separate
result for the three variables of interest: logarithm of income, hours worked in patient care and hours in medical activities.
89
Table 3.8: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Pediatricians
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel Sample 1 Panel Sample 2
Panel A: Participation in Medicaid
4Q∗D98∗PED 0.184 -0.001 0.053
(0.114) (0.062) (0.059)










Panel B: Percentage of revenues from Medicaid
4Q∗D98∗PED 54.771 -3.436 -6.998
(12.224) (4.911) (6.720)










Panel C: Acceptance of New Medicaid Patients
4Q∗D98∗PED 0.563 0.214 0.179
(0.148) (0.085) (0.063)










N 21526 8499 8499
n 2,833 2,833
Physician controls Y N N
State FE Y N N
Year FE Y Y Y
Physicians FE N Y Y
Clusters 44 41 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. Weights from CTPS are used in all specifications. The table reports the coefficients
βt of Equation 3.7, that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the separate
result for the three variables of interest: binary variable for physician receiving any revenue from Medicaid (physicians participates in Medicaid),
the percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid, and a binary variables for acceptance of new Medicaid patients.
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Table 3.9: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Pediatricians
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel Sample 1 Panel Sample 2
Panel A: Solo practice
4Q∗D98∗PED -0.241 0.000 0.008
(0.107) (0.065) (0.063)










Panel B: Group practice
4Q∗D98∗PED 0.235 0.030 0.000
(0.090) (0.127) (0.155)











4Q∗D98∗PED -0.051 -0.031 -0.009
(0.057) (0.061) (0.087)










N 21,526 8,499 8,499
n 2,833 2,833
Physician controls Y N N
State FE Y N N
Year FE Y Y Y
Physicians FE N Y Y
Clusters 44 41 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. Weights from CTPS are used in all specifications. The table reports the coefficients
βt of Equation 3.7, that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the separate
result for the three variables of interest: binary variable for physician in solo practices, group practices, and hospitals.
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Appendix A
Additional Tables and Figures Chapter 1
Figure A.1: Medicaid Expenditures on Nursing Homes, Personal Care Services, and Other HCBS
Note: Trends are computed from Medicaid Long Term Services and Supports (LTSS) Expenditure Reports.
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Figure A.2: Persons Served in Nursing Facilities Whose Stays Are Covered by Medicare, and
Covered Days of Care and Charges to Medicare
Note: Trends are computed from Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement for the study period.
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Table A.1: Certificate of Need Laws and Moratorium Rules by State (1998)
State Nursing Homes Other Long Term Care Services
Moratoriuma CONb Moratorium CON Moratorium CON Moratorium CON CON Total
HHAc HHA Hospital Bed Hospital Bed Residential Residential Adult Day Restrictions
Conversion Conversion Cared Care Care Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alabama 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
Alaska 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colorado 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Connecticut 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 5
Delaware 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
D.C. 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 5
Florida 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3
Hawaii 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
Indiana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Iowa 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 5
Louisiana 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Maine 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
Maryland 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
Massachusetts 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6
Michigan 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
Minnesota 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
Mississippi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8
Missouri 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6
Montana 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
Nebraska 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.1 continued from previous page
State Nursing Homes Other Long Term Care Services
Moratoriuma CONb Moratorium CON Moratorium CON Moratorium CON CON Total
HHAc HHA Hospital Bed Hospital Bed Residential Residential Adult Day Restrictions
Conversion Conversion Cared Care Care Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
New Hampshire 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
New Jersey 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 4
North Carolina 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 4
North Dakota 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
Ohio 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Oklahoma 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Oregon 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
South Carolina 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
South Dakota 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Tennessee 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
Texas 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Utah 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Vermont 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
Virginia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Washington 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
West Virginia 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 6
Wisconsin 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
Wyoming 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Note: The table identifies every state with a certificate–of-need Law (CON) and/or a Moratorium Law in 1998. A value of one indicates that the state had a program in place;
however, the specific criteria and enforcement may vary state by state. Column 10 reports the sum of columns one through nine and shows the total number of programs
that the state had to limit supply growth.
a Moratorium: Prohibits the addition of any new beds.
b Certificate of Need Laws (CON): Each state may establish its own criteria for entry of new providers, expansion of existing number of beds, and purchase of new equipment,
among other things related to the supply of services.
c Home Health Care Agencies (HHAs): Agencies that serve people who need frequent medical treatment along with personal care. The service is provided in the beneficiary’s
home.
d Residential Care: Facilities that provide services to individuals not requiring skilled nursing care. They provide supportive care and supervision services such as foster care,
family homes, group homes among others.
Source: The table summarizes information reported in Harrington and Carrillo (1998).
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Table A.2: State Characteristics by CON Status (1998-2000)
Nursing Homes Hospital Bed Conversion Home and Health Agencies
Units No CON CON p–value dif No CON CON p–value dif No CON CON p–value dif
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Nursing Home Market
1. Occupancy Rate % 0.851 0.865 0.171 0.837 0.876 0 0.85 0.884 0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
2. Nursing Homes 100,000 48.081 48.881 0.822 53.502 45.581 0.015 53.648 38.349 0
elderly (2.996) (1.895) (2.520) (2.006) (1.812) (2.602)
3. Hospital-Based Nursing Homes 100,000 10.739 8.498 0.092 11.276 7.785 0.004 8.675 10.095 0.269
elderly (1.117) (0.706) (0.941) (0.749) (0.731) (1.050)
4. Beds Nursing Homes 100,000 4586.364 5173.726 0.043 5243.912 4855.172 0.149 5394.307 4204.835 0
elderly (242.716) (153.507) (209.815) (166.976) (150.092) (215.553)
5. Beds Hospital-Based Nursing Homes 100,000 588.624 525.916 0.508 713.251 436.534 0.001 536.033 559.919 0.793
elderly (79.798) (50.469) (66.204) (52.687) (52.042) (74.740)
6. Total Employment at Nursing Homes 100,000 4580.923 4733.516 0.62 4806.592 4616.025 0.504 5033.754 3980.755 0
elderly (259.594) (164.181) (222.679) (177.213) (161.681) (232.197)
7. For-Profit % 0.573 0.623 0.115 0.587 0.623 0.221 0.611 0.605 0.829
0.027 0.017 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.025
8. Chain-Owned % 0.622 0.512 0 0.587 0.516 0.001 0.554 0.522 0.147
0.018 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.018
Panel B: Other Healthcare Markets
9. Home and Health Agencies 100,000 54.492 49.855 0.202 52.683 50.228 0.467 53.253 46.904 0.069
elderly (3.060) (1.935) (2.637) (2.098) (1.982) (2.846)
10. Assisted Living Facilities 100,000 54.526 57.373 0.665 50.729 60.252 0.116 54.723 60.348 0.373
elderly (5.539) (3.503) (4.718) (3.754) (3.600) (5.171)
11. Adult Day Care Facilities 100,000 42.062 49.734 0.073 46.07 48.474 0.547 45.559 51.631 0.142
elderly (3.595) (2.273) (3.116) (2.480) (2.350) (3.375)
12. Short-Acute Care Hospitals 100,000 24.912 21.181 0.122 25.707 20.056 0.011 21.772 23.228 0.532
elderly (2.026) (1.281) (1.714) (1.364) (1.329) (1.908)
13. Long-Acute Care Hospitals 100,000 0.942 0.667 0.048 1.105 0.518 0 0.921 0.385 0
elderly (0.116) (0.073) (0.094) (0.075) (0.072) (0.104)
14. Number of states 14 37 19 32 33 18
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Table A.2 continued from previous page
Residential Care Adult Day Care Restrictions≥4
Units No CON CON p–value dif No CON CON p–value dif Unconstrained Constrained p–value dif
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Panel A: Nursing Home Market
1. Occupancy Rate % 0.852 0.886 0.001 0.856 0.921 0 0.854 0.879 0.017
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009)
2. Nursing Homes 100,000 49.473 46.599 0.418 49.616 37.805 0.042 51.406 41.768 0.006
elderly (1.891) (2.990) (1.648) (5.527) (1.846) (2.920)
3. Hospital-Based Nursing Homes 100,000 9.869 7.313 0.054 9.113 9.43 0.886 8.582 10.529 0.144
elderly (0.704) (1.113) (0.629) (2.110) (0.708) (1.119)
4. Beds Nursing Homes 100,000 4873.966 5335.763 0.112 5075.379 4224.364 0.076 5137.321 4677.376 0.113
elderly (154.350) (244.049) (135.827) (455.577) (154.361) (244.067)
5. Beds Hospital-Based Nursing Homes 100,000 566.485 487.202 0.402 545.117 529.382 0.92 518.705 606.652 0.352
elderly (50.423) (79.726) (44.575) (149.511) (50.395) (79.681)
6. Total Employment at Nursing Homes 100,000 4560.782 5012.758 0.141 4753.618 3973.298 0.123 4794.892 4427.484 0.232
elderly (163.092) (257.871) (143.730) (482.085) (163.510) (258.532)
7. For-Profit % 0.592 0.651 0.069 0.611 0.584 0.607 0.619 0.584 0.269
0.017 0.027 0.015 0.051 0.017 0.027
8. Chain-Owned % 0.559 0.505 0.018 0.547 0.507 0.295 0.572 0.473 0
0.012 0.019 0.011 0.036 0.012 0.018
Panel B: Other Healthcare Markets
9. Home and Health Agencies 100,000 52.874 46.942 0.102 51.543 47.086 0.458 53.205 46.117 0.05
elderly (1.928) (3.049) (1.713) (5.746) (1.921) (3.037)
10. Assisted Living Facilities 100,000 62.253 42.325 0.002 58.149 38.677 0.071 55.528 59.139 0.582
elderly (3.392) (5.363) (3.057) (10.253) (3.502) (5.537)
11. Adult Day Care Facilities 100,000 48.392 45.416 0.489 47.355 49.637 0.748 44.239 55.799 0.007
elderly (2.295) (3.629) (2.027) (6.797) (2.241) (3.543)
12. Short-Acute Care Hospitals 100,000 23.817 18.323 0.022 22.205 22.72 0.898 21.467 24.199 0.258
elderly (1.269) (2.006) (1.139) (3.821) (1.286) (2.033)
13. Long-Acute Care Hospitals 100,000 0.78 0.661 0.396 0.754 0.652 0.657 0.891 0.382 0
elderly (0.074) (0.117) (0.066) (0.220) (0.071) (0.112)
14. Number of states 36 15 46 5 33 18
Source: I obtain CON laws from Harrington and Carrillo (1998), and compute statistics using information from the county business pattern, the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting
(OSCAR), and Medicare Cost Reports.
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Table A.3: Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Individuals Served and Expenditures
in Nursing Homes Binning the Total Restrictions Variable (State–Level Analysis)
Medicare Medicaid
Persons Served Expenditure Persons Served Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST ×(restrictions = 1,restrictions = 2) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.044 -0.024 -0.073∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.066) (0.039) (0.026)
POST ×(restrictions = 3) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.048 0.017 -0.092
(0.013) (0.063) (0.037) (0.085)
POST ×(restrictions≥ 4) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.071 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.070) (0.019) (0.033)
Mean 52441.73 723852.82 58264.19 1127174.29
Observations 336 336 336 336
Note: Each column of the table reports the DD estimators for different groups of the continuous variable Total Restrictions. The omitted group is
states with no restrictions. All the regressions are weighted with the pre–period population over 75 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Admissions Binning the
Occupancy Rate Variable (Facility–Level Analysis)
Medicare Medicaid Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST ×High 0.027 -0.061∗ -0.016
(0.020) (0.031) (0.023)
POST ×(0.8≥ Occupancy < 0.85) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.063
(0.016) (0.040) (0.038)
POST ×(0.85≥ Occupancy < 0.9) -0.036∗∗ -0.059∗ -0.053
(0.017) (0.032) (0.033)
POST ×(0.90≥ Occupancy < 0.95) -0.029 -0.080∗∗ -0.047
(0.025) (0.034) (0.036)
POST ×(0.95≥ Occupancy≤ 1) 0.043∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.044
(0.025) (0.046) (0.037)
Observations 82116 82116 82116
Mean 54.48 107.93 86
State–year FE Y
Facility FE Y
Note: The table reports the DD estimator POST ×Constrained for two separate regressions. The first column reports the DD estimator using the
binary variable High to distinguished between constrained and unconstrained facilities. I identify as High occupancy rate facilities those who have
an occupancy rate above 90% in the pre–period. In the second column I report the estimators for four bins of the occupancy rate variable. All
regressions are weighted with the number of beds observed in the pre–period; include state–year FE and facility FE, and include covariates at the
county level such as per–capita income, unemployment rate, and demographic variables. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Medicaid Person Served Inclusive All
Covariates (State–Level Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POST ×Constrained -0.066∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
% Black(t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
% White(t-1) 0.076∗ 0.077 0.087∗∗ 0.075∗
(0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.040)
% Female(t-1) 0.118 0.093 0.134 0.167
(0.140) (0.137) (0.117) (0.122)
% Ages 20-64(t-1) -0.051∗ -0.060∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.051∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
% Ages 65+ -0.081∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.080∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034)
Log(Per–Capita Income(t-1)) -0.154 -0.165 -0.125
(0.527) (0.512) (0.529)
Unemployment Rate(t-1) -0.015 -0.013 -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
% Assisted Living(t-1) -0.031∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
% Adult Day Care(t-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)




Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Note: The table reports the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the logarithm of number of Medicaid persons served
on the DD estimator, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and the set of listed covariates. All the regressions are weighted with the pre–period
population over 75 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Medicaid Utilization Rate per 100,000 Population
Inclusive All Covariates (State–Level Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POST ×Constrained -38.958∗∗∗ -42.954∗∗∗ -41.481∗∗∗ -40.645∗∗∗ -40.722∗∗∗
(10.764) (12.391) (12.683) (13.102) (13.110)
% Black(t-1) 0.128 0.100 0.135 0.090
(0.289) (0.282) (0.266) (0.285)
% White(t-1) 28.918 25.147 30.002 24.885
(22.202) (23.420) (21.967) (20.652)
% Female(t-1) -24.421 -36.019 -17.358 -3.049
(88.261) (86.496) (77.995) (82.548)
% Ages 20-64(t-1) -22.926 -21.956 -27.447 -18.898
(15.577) (18.301) (18.214) (18.636)
% Ages 65+ -14.740 -13.255 -14.421 -10.771
(20.104) (21.749) (22.458) (21.989)
Log(Per–Capita Income(t-1)) -187.482 -211.987 -194.488
(342.670) (338.809) (349.879)
Unemployment Rate(t-1) -5.138 -5.221 -4.503
(7.011) (6.991) (7.309)
% Assisted Living(t-1) -17.712∗ -18.213∗∗
(8.926) (8.805)
% Adult Day Care(t-1) 29.462∗∗ 32.142∗∗
(12.186) (13.099)




Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Note: The table reports the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the fraction of Medicaid persons served in nursing
homes on the DD estimator, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and the set of listed covariates. All the regressions are weighted with the
pre–period population over 75 years of age. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.7: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Number of Individuals Served and
Expenditure in Nursing Homes by Type of Payer. All States. (State–Level Analysis)
Coefficient on POST ×Constrained Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare Persons Served 0.037 0.011 0.021 54047.216
(0.025) (0.020) (0.021)
Medicare Expenditure 0.035 0.023 0.026 752093.21
(0.034) (0.029) (0.030)
Medicaid Persons Served -0.011 -0.027 0.007 65886.192
(0.042) (0.021) (0.033)
Medicaid Expenditure -0.055 -0.066∗∗ -0.064 1410526.8
(0.039) (0.032) (0.047)
bservations 357 357 357
Weight Y Y Y
Controls N Y N
Note: In each cell of the table I report the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the dependent variables in each row on
the DD estimator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In the first column I report coefficient estimates from a weighted linear model without
controls. In the second column I report the coefficient from a specification that includes controls and uses weights. I use the income per–capita,
unemployment rate, assisted living facilities per 100,000 population, adult day care facilities per 100,000 population, participants in HCBS per
100,000 population, and the fraction of the population that is: black, white, female, 20-64 years old, and greater than 64 years old. In the third
column I report the same coefficient but using no weights and no controls.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.8: DD Effects of Medicare Fee Increase on Home and Community-Based Services
(State–Level Analysis)
Participants Expenditure
All HCBS Personal Care and 1915(c) All HCBS HCBS Aged and Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST ×Constrained -0.116 -0.090 -0.235∗∗ -0.185
(0.098) (0.094) (0.098) (0.152)
Mean 77540.83 51575.51 500864.91 220528.48
Observations 336 376 384 384
Period 1999-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005
Note: In each cell of the table I report the DD estimator POST ×Constrained from separate regressions of the dependent variables in each
column on the DD estimator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In the first column I report coefficient estimates for the total number of
Medicaid participants in HCBS programs. I construct the total number of participants from Kitchener, Ng and Harrington (2007) and O’Malley
and Musumeci (2018). In the second column I report the coefficient for Personal Care and Title 1915(c) programs. These are HCBS programs that
have information available from 1997. I construct the time series using the information on LeBlanc, Tonner and Harrington (2001),Kitchener, Ng
and Harrington (2007) and O’Malley and Musumeci (2018). In the third column I report the DD coefficient for the total Medicaid expenditure in
HCBS and in the last column I use the expenditure only on aged and disabled population. I obtain the expenditure information from Medicaid
Long Term Services and Support files.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Effects of Medicaid HCBS Participants on Medicaid Nursing Home Participants
Using Lags and Leads (State–Level Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(HCBS(t-2)) 0.091
(0.057)
Log(HCBS(t-1)) -0.005 0.030 0.038 0.029





Observations 240 288 288 288
Period 2001-2005
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Medicaid person served in nursing homes. Each column is a separate regression of the dependent
variable on state fixed effects, year fixed effects and the corresponding lags and leads. I use weights in all regression and clustered the standard
errors at the state level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Additional Tables and Figures Chapter 2






-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years since user access
Note: The figure shows coefficients and associated clustered standard errors from an event study in which log number
of suicides is the dependent variable, and the year of PDMP implementation is the baseline year (t = 0). This regression
is run at the county–year level, and includes county FE and year FE.
114







-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years since user access
Note: The figure shows coefficients and associated clustered standard errors from an event study in which log num-
ber of facilities is the dependent variable, and the year of PDMP implementation is the baseline year (t = 0). This
regression is run at the county–year level, and includes county FE and year FE.
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Table B.1: Date of PDMP Implementation by State
State PDMP PDMP Mandatorya Source







Connecticut Mar-09 State PDMP administratorc






Louisiana Jan-09 Yes NAMSDL
Maine Jan-05 NAMSDL
Maryland Jan-14 NAMSDL




New Jersey Jan-12 NAMSDL
New Mexico Aug-05 NAMSDL
North Carolina Oct-07 NAMSDL
North Dakota Sep-07 State PDMP administrator
Ohio Oct-06 Yes NAMSDL
Oklahoma Jul-06 Yes NAMSDL
Oregon Sep-11 NAMSDL
South Carolina Jun-08 NAMSDL











Note: This table reports the date that providers and other users had access to PDMP information, in states that enacted their PDMP legislation after the PDMP Model Act of 2003.
a The information on states with mandatory access was obtained from Buchmueller and Carey (2018). There are in total six states with PDMP mandatory (DE, KY, LA, NV, OH and OK), however
two of them implemented a PDMP before the Model Prescription Monitoring Program Act.
b Find more details in http://www.namsdl.org/library/580225E9-E469-AFA9-50E7579C1D738E71/.
c Contact information is available at http://www.namsdl.org/library/CBF7383C-EA1E-69E4-E15A9FC9F0C68F1C
d Participation by patients and physicians is voluntary. PDMP will be mandatory starting on Jan. 1, 2017.
e PDMP will be available for query starting on Aug. 25, 2016.
f Became operational at the end of the study period.
g MO has not enacted a PDMP, and DC’s PDMP became operational in July 01, 2016.
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Table B.2: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities Using the Logarithm of Facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Log(Facilities(t-1)) 0.017 0.023∗∗ 0.019∗ -0.014 0.003 -0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021)
PDMP*Log(Facilities(t-1)) -0.016 -0.033∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
Mean 52.88 52.88 52.88 52.21 52.21 52.21
Unweighted mean 12.83 12.83 12.83 11.44 11.44 11.44
Observations 17563 17563 17563 19587 19587 19587
Counties 1639 1639 1639 1712 1712 1712
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the log of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year. The
information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions are weighted
by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and
state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.3: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities Using PDMP Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: All
Facilities(t-1) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Score*Facilities(t-1) -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean 50.21 50.21 49.23 49.23
Unweighted mean 10.85 10.85 9.34 9.34
Observations 22477 22477 25785 25785
Counties 1714 1714 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 and 2, and Poisson models in the rest. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions
include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.4: Effects of PDMPs by State-Level Treatment Availability Using Standardized
Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: log suicides. OLS regressions.
PDMP -0.003 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011







Panel B. Dependent variable: suicide count. Poisson regressions.
PDMP -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗







Mean 206.31 206.31 206.31 206.31
Unweighted Mean 107.73 107.73 107.73 107.73
Observations 2430 2430 2430 2430
States 38 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from two types of models. Panel A corresponds to OLS models where the dependent variable is the
logarithm of suicides in a state× quarter. Panel B shows the results for Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of suicides
in a state× quarter. The independent variables are standardized, and all the regressions control for state FE and quarter FE. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are clustered by state. The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each state. The
weighted mean (‘Mean’) and unweighted mean were computed in the pre-period.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status and Across Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: suicide count
All Female Male
Panel A: Facilities
Facilities(t-1) -0.048∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Panel B: PDMP: All
Facilities(t-1) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel C: PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.048∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.124∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗
(0.025) (0.013) (0.030)
Mean 49.23 11.64 37.82
Unweighted mean 9.34 2.05 7.29
Observations 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of suicides of white non-Hispanic
by gender. The observations are at the county× year level. The independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each
county× year (in weighted standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County
Business Patterns (CBP). Each of the panels correspond to separate regressions for each of the interaction variables. All the regressions control for
county and state–year FE. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic
population in each gender and county.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status. All Races and All Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.066∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.025 -0.048∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.032) (0.007) (0.028)
Mean 98.84 98.84 98.84 97.49 97.49 97.49
Unweighted mean 14.72 14.72 14.72 13.36 13.36 13.36
Observations 23620 23620 23620 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1717 1717 1717 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are weighted by population in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Effects of PDMPs by State-Level Treatment Availability. All Races and All Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: log suicides. OLS regressions.
PDMP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001







Panel B. Dependent variable: suicide count. Poisson regressions.
PDMP -0.015 -0.005 -0.011 -0.014







Mean 325.29 325.29 325.29 325.29
Unweighted mean 107.73 107.73 107.73 107.73
Observations 2432 2432 2432 2176
States 38 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from two types of models. Panel A corresponds to OLS models where the dependent variable is the
logarithm of suicides in a state× quarter. Panel B shows the results for Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of suicides
in a state× quarter. The independent variables are in logs, and all the regressions control for state FE and quarter FE. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered by state. The regressions are weighted by population in each state. The weighted mean (‘Mean’) and unweighted
mean were computed in the pre-period.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.8: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status and Across Rural and
Urban Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: suicide count
All Large urban Medium/Small urban Rural
Panel A: Facilities
Facilities (t-1) -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.109
(0.004) (0.004) (0.041) (0.143)
Panel B: PDMP: All
Facilities (t-1) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.119
(0.005) (0.006) (0.058) (0.290)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.342)
Panel C: PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities (t-1) -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.114
(0.004) (0.005) (0.041) (0.147)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.124∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.139
(0.025) (0.005) (0.045) (0.109)
Mean 49.23 81.15 26.34 5.61
Unweighted mean 9.34 28.51 13.41 3.05
Observations 25785 3666 6324 15795
Counties 1720 245 422 1052
Clusters 38 28 37 36
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of suicides of white non-Hispanic in
the age profile. The dependent variable is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in
each county× year (in weighted standard deviations). Each of the panels correspond to separate regressions for each of the interaction variables.
All the regressions control for county and state–year FE. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. The regressions are weighted
by the white non-Hispanic population in each age profile and state.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.9: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status and Using All States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities (t-1) -0.059∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PDMP*Facilities (t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.086∗
(0.004) (0.051) (0.002) (0.045)
Mean 49.90 49.90 49.90 48.92 48.92 48.92
Unweighted mean 10.74 10.74 10.74 9.24 9.24 9.24
Observations 32965 32965 32965 37601 37601 37601
Counties 2499 2499 2499 2508 2508 2508
Clusters 50 50 50 51 51 51
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable is
at the county×year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county×year (in standard deviations).
The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions include all
the states, even those that implemented a PDMP before the PDMP Model Act of 2003. The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic
population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.10: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status After Including
Demographic and Economic Covariates. Ols
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: suicide rate per 100,000 population
PDMP: All
Facilities(t-1) -0.044 -0.046 -0.045 -0.048 -0.044 -0.055
(0.072) (0.064) (0.072) (0.069) (0.070) (0.058)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.071∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗







%Under 18 age(t-1) 0.009 -0.012
(0.030) (0.029)
%18–64 years old(t-1) 0.038 0.044
(0.037) (0.041)




Mean 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66
Unweighted mean 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
Observations 22477 22477 22477 22477 22463 22463
Counties 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714
Clusters 37 37 37 37 37 37
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models. The dependent variable is at the county× year level, and the independent variable
is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county
level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population
over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE, and control variables such as
the fraction of the county population that is white, the fraction that is black and the fraction that is male. Also, county–level economic conditions
(unemployment rate and per–capita income) where included. The total number of observation decreases in the last two columns because some
counties dont’ have information on per–capita income for all the years.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.11: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status After Including
Demographic and Economic Covariates. Ols
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log suicides rate
PDMP: All
Facilities(t-1) -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011
(0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗







%Under 18 age(t-1) 0.000 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
%18–64 years old(t-1) -0.010 -0.004
(0.006) (0.007)




Mean 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66
Unweighted mean 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
Observations 22477 22477 22477 22477 22463 22463
Counties 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714
Clusters 37 37 37 37 37 37
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models. The dependent variable is at the county× year level, and the independent variable
is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county
level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population
over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE, and control variables such as
the fraction of the county population that is white, the fraction that is black and the fraction that is male. Also, county–level economic conditions
(unemployment rate and per–capita income) where included. The total number of observation decreases in the last two columns because some
counties dont’ have information on per–capita income for all the years.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.12: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status After Including
Demographic and Economic Covariates. Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: suicides
PDMP: All
Facilities(t-1) 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗







%Under 18 age(t-1) -0.005 -0.011∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
%18–64 years old(t-1) -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)




Mean 49.23 49.23 49.23 49.23 49.23 49.23
Unweighted mean 9.34 9.34 9.34 9.34 9.34 9.34
Observations 25785 25785 25785 25785 25750 25750
Counties 1720 1720 1720 1720 1719 1719
Clusters 38 38 38 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from poisson models where population is used as an offset variable. The dependent variable is
at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions
include county and state–year FE, and control variables such as the fraction of the county population that is white, the fraction that is black and the
fraction that is male. Also, county–level economic conditions (unemployment rate and per–capita income) where included. The total number of
observation decreases in the last two columns because some counties dont’ have information on per–capita income for all the years.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
126
Table B.13: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status and Using Suicides
Committed by Other Means Besides Drugs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities (t-1) -0.027∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
PDMP*Facilities (t-1) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.056) (0.002) (0.032)
Mean 41.68 41.68 41.68 40.74 40.74 40.74
Unweighted mean 9.39 9.39 9.39 7.94 7.94 7.94
Observations 22115 22115 22115 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1712 1712 1712 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in standard
deviations). The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level.
All the regressions include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.14: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status in Counties with
Suicides in Every Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.031) (0.001) (0.025)
Mean 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93
Unweighted mean 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36
Observations 13533 13533 13533 13548 13548 13548
Counties 903 903 903 904 904 904
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable is
at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted standard
deviations). The difference in number of observations between the linear and Poisson model is due to the exclusion of District of Columbia (DC) in
the the linear model with fixed effects, because DC is a group with only one member. The information of facilities at the county level comes from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old
in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE. The regressions only include counties with
positive counts of suicides for all years.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.15: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status Taking Suicides+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log(suicides+1) Dependent variable: (suicide+1) count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.001 0.020 -0.001 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.062) (0.052) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.024∗ -0.072 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.046) (0.002) (0.028)
Mean 50.23 50.23 50.23 50.23 50.23 50.23
Unweighted mean 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34
Observations 25770 25770 25770 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1719 1719 1719 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable is
at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted standard
deviations). For all the specifications we add one to suicides, so all the observations use in the Poisson model should be use in the logarithm
specification. However, the 15 observations from District of Columbia (DC) are excluded from the linear model with fixed effects, because DC is
a group with only one member. The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns
(CBP). The regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All
the regressions include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.16: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status. Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.008∗∗ -0.004 -0.008∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.001 -0.008 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.005) (0.036) (0.001) (0.010)
Mean 50.21 50.21 50.21 49.23 49.23 49.23
Unweighted mean 10.85 10.85 10.85 9.34 9.34 9.34
Observations 22477 22477 22477 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1714 1714 1714 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are clustered at the state level. All the regressions include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.17: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status. Unweighted for
Counties with Suicides in All Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.007 -0.041∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.001) (0.012)
Mean 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93 53.93
Unweighted mean 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36 16.36
Observations 13533 13533 13533 13548 13548 13548
Counties 903 903 903 904 904 904
Clusters 37 37 37 38 38 38
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable is
at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted standard
deviations). The difference in the number of observations between the linear and Poisson model is due to the exclusion of District of Columbia
(DC) in the the linear model with fixed effects, because DC is a group with only one member. The information of facilities at the county level
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The regressions are clustered at the state level. All the regressions include
county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.18: Effects of County-Level Treatment Facilities by PDMP Status Clustering at the
County Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson
Dependent variable: log suicides Dependent variable: suicide count
PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory PDMP: All PDMP: Mandatory
Facilities(t-1) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
PDMP*Facilities(t-1) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.099∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.052) (0.003) (0.046)
Mean 50.21 50.21 50.21 49.23 49.23 49.23
Unweighted mean 10.85 10.85 10.85 9.34 9.34 9.34
Observations 22477 22477 22477 25785 25785 25785
Counties 1714 1714 1714 1720 1720 1720
Clusters 1714 1714 1714 1720 1720 1720
Note: The table reports parameter estimates from linear models in columns 1 to 3, and Poisson models in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable
is at the county× year level, and the independent variable is the lag of the number of treatment facilities in each county× year (in weighted
standard deviations). The information of facilities at the county level comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP). The
regressions are weighted by the white non-Hispanic population over 30 years old in each county, and clustered at the state level. All the regressions
include county and state–year FE.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C
Additional Tables and Figure Chapter 3
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(Millions)
Traditional Medicaid M-SCHIP S-SCHIP
The graph shows the number of children enrolled in the programs at least one month during the year. Source: author’s
compilation. Data were cited to come from CMS’s SCHIP Statistical Enrollment Data System (SEDS), MSIS/2082
and CMS Annual Reports.
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Table C.1: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Pediatricians
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel sample
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Logarithm of income
4Qs ∗D98 0.113 [0.69] 0.034 [0.66]
(0.285) (0.078)
4Qs ∗D00 -0.364 [0.02] 0.185 [0.57]
(0.154) (0.329)
Panel B: Hours worked in patient care
4Qs ∗D98 -1.829 [0.60] 1.905 [0.67]
(3.497) (4.468)
4Qs ∗D00 -7.156 [0.20] -9.883 [0.06]
(5.580) (5.222)
Panel C: Hours worked in medical activities
4Qs ∗D98 -1.951 [0.56] -1.335 [0.77]
(3.347) (4.743)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 37
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: logarithm of income, hours worked in patient care and hours in
medical activities. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control for physician
characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic in experience. Year and state fixed effects were also included.
Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
131
Table C.2: Effect of CHIP on Variables Related with Access to Care of Medicaid Patients
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel sample
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Physician participates in Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 -0.281 [0.01] -0.219 [0.01]
(0.115) (0.088)
4Qs ∗D00 -0.246 [0.00] -0.325 [0.00]
(0.090) (0.096)
Panel B: Percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 -13.668 [0.34] -19.875 [0.13]
(14.370) (13.098)
4Qs ∗D00 -21.496 [0.00] -28.851 [0.00]
(5.847) (10.640)
Panel C: Acceptance of new Medicaid patient
4Qs ∗D98 -0.024 [0.71] -0.069 [0.61]
(0.065) (0.137)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 37
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: binary variable for physician receiving any revenue from Medicaid
(physicians participates in Medicaid), the percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid, and a binary variables for
acceptance of new Medicaid patients. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control
for physician characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic of experience. Year and state fixed effects were also
included. Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
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Table C.3: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Other Primary Care Physicians (Internists, General
Practice)
Variable Longitudinal Panel
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Logarithm of income
4Qs ∗D98 0.151 [0.15] 0.039 [0.66]
(0.103) (0.089)
4Qs ∗D00 0.056 [0.61] 0.015 [0.91]
(0.110) (0.138)
Panel B: Hours worked in patient care
4Qs ∗D98 3.306 [0.29] 1.122 [0.72]
(3.097) (3.167)
4Qs ∗D00 -5.860 [0.27] -1.118 [0.67]
(5.243) (2.654)
Panel C: Hours worked in medical activities
4Qs ∗D98 2.688 [0.40] 0.268 [0.92]
(3.206) (2.963)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: logarithm of income, hours worked in patient care and hours in
medical activities. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control for physician
characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic of experience. Year and state fixed effects were also included.
Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
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Table C.4: Effect of CHIP on Medicaid Variables of Other Primary Care Physicians (Internists,
General Practice)
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel sample
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Physician participates in Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 -0.066 [0.34] -0.074 [0.32]
(0.069) (0.074)
4Qs ∗D00 -0.108 [0.36] -0.151 [0.05]
(0.118) (0.076)
Panel B: Percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 -1.411 [0.66] -3.909 [0.03]
(3.216) (1.821)
4Qs ∗D00 -5.936 [0.27] -2.438 [0.26]
(5.404) (2.156)
Panel C: Acceptance of new Medicaid patient
4Qs ∗D98 0.033 [0.48] 0.028 [0.71]
(0.047) (0.077)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: binary variable for physician receiving any revenue from Medicaid
(physicians participates in Medicaid), the percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid, and a binary variables for
acceptance of new Medicaid patients. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control
for physician characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic of experience. Year and state fixed effects were also
included. Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
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Table C.5: Effect of CHIP on Labor Supply of Specialists
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel sample
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Logarithm of income
4Qs ∗D98 0.005 [0.95] -0.058 [0.33]
(0.099) (0.059)
4Qs ∗D98 -0.001 [0.99] -0.081 [0.31]
(0.165) (0.080)
Panel B: Hours worked in patient care
4Qs ∗D98 1.729 [0.68] -0.874 [0.86]
(4.253) (5.046)
4Qs ∗D00 2.506 [0.62] -8.364 [0.14]
(5.057) (5.576)
Panel C: Hours worked in medical activities
4Qs ∗D98 0.055 [0.97] -1.398 [0.70]
(2.004) (3.723)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 41
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: logarithm of income, hours worked in patient care and hours in
medical activities. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control for physician
characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic of experience. Year and state fixed effects were also included.
Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
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Table C.6: Effect of CHIP on Medicaid Variables of Specialists
Variable Longitudinal sample Panel sample
βt p− values βt p− values
Panel A: Physician participates in Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 0.093 [0.08] -0.061 [0.53]
(0.053) (0.097)
4Qs ∗D00 0.066 [0.13] -0.209 [0.01]
(0.043) (0.081)
Panel B: Percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid
4Qs ∗D98 7.118 [0.01] 0.235 [0.94]
(2.866) (3.326)
4Qs ∗D00 6.223 [0.18] -1.418 [0.74]
(4.566) (4.249)
Panel C: Acceptance of new Medicaid patient
4Qs ∗D98 0.074 [0.15] -0.129 [0.15]
(0.051) (0.088)




Physician controls Y N
State FE Y N
Year FE Y Y
Physician FE N Y
Clusters 44 39
Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. The table reports the coefficients βt of Equation 3.7,
that measure the impact of higher CHIP expansion rates on the outcome of interest. Each of the Panel contains the
separate result for the three variables of interest: binary variable for physician receiving any revenue from Medicaid
(physicians participates in Medicaid), the percentage of practice revenues from Medicaid, and a binary variables for
acceptance of new Medicaid patients. Column 1 contains the estimation for the longitudinal sample, where I control
for physician characteristics, in particular, gender and a quartic of experience. Year and state fixed effects were also
included. Column 3 reports the coefficients when I use the panel sample.
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